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ABSTRACT
This article identifies copyright impediments existing in the sphere of
science, to then make (tentative) suggestions as to how these may be
overcome. It focuses on scholarly publishing only, and here primarily on
digital content, specifically asking whether expensive commercial scholarly
publishers continue to “add value” to research in the digital era. The deficits
of copyright law and potential solutions thereto are assessed in the light of
the right of everyone “to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications” (REBSPA) as laid down in Article 15(1)(b) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966. A
substantial part of the discussion examines whether and, if so, in what ways,
the REBSPA gives rise to a “right to research,” also in an extraterritorial
sense that would require the right to be respected beyond borders, and what
the normative implications of such a right would be for copyright and science.
It is submitted that current interpretations of the REBSPA reveal flaws and
gaps. The REBSPA is accordingly reinterpreted in accordance with what is
called a more human rights-oriented approach here, its guiding concept being
that of “adequacy for science.” The article finds that, while existing copyright
law needs certain reforms in the interim to accommodate the needs of science,
in the longer term, entire institutionalized science may have to be
reconceived. Genuinely open science and the creation of a “true” scholarly
knowledge commons require far-reaching changes in the way copyright
applies in the sphere of science. The continued role of commercial scholarly
publishing needs to be questioned. Potentially, it will be necessary to “move
beyond” the applicability of copyright in the field of science. 2
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INTRODUCTION
“Scholarly communication” relates to “how scholars in any field … use
and disseminate information through formal and informal channels.” 3
Scholarly communication is of crucial importance. Building on Robert
Merton’s seminal work on the normative structure of science, 4 John Ziman
know.
3
Christine L. Borgman, Bibliometrics and Scholarly Communication, 16 COMM. RES. 583,
586 (1989).
4
Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure of Science (1942), in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267–78 (Norman W. Storer
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identifies as two fundamental principles of science those of “originality” and
“scepticism.” 5 While the former signifies that scientists engage in a process
of creating new knowledge (or understanding), the latter makes it clear that
any advance can count as such only once knowledge (or its understanding)
has been universally validated by the scientific community. Hence, new
knowledge emerges only once scientists have disseminated their findings to
researchers around the world and these have tested and confirmed the
conclusions concerned. The latter researchers in turn rely – and depend – on
these conclusions to further develop their own theories. New knowledge is
seldom constructed out of the blue. As Isaac Newton famously remarked,
“[i]f I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” 6 The
scientist “who is unable to give or receive information in his or her field of
work might as well not exist as far as the world of science is concerned.” 7
Science accordingly depends on channels of scholarly communication
being and remaining open. It is important, therefore, that obstacles impeding
the dissemination of, access to, and use of scholarly information “be
addressed effectively.” A significant obstacle exists in the form of copyright.
In doing the research for this article, this writer had sought to digitally retrieve
a copyrighted article written by a director of the Max Planck Institute for
Innovation and Competition in Munich (a former employer). As none of the
libraries to which this author had access subscribed to it and by reason of its
paywalled nature, it proved impossible to gain (affordable) access to the
article, not even through shadowy channels. 8 The article is ironically entitled,
“Copyright Law and the Scientist.” 9 This goes to show that the relationship
between copyright and science is – mildly put – complex. While scientists
desire the unhindered flow of information, at any rate the commercial
publishers (academic writers frequently conferring their copyright or
substantial entitlements under it to publishers) have an interest in imposing
restrictions on the dissemination of, access to, and use of such information in
order to make a profit. There exists a clear tension between the needs of
science and the interests of publishers. Still prior to the full swing of the
digital era, Stewart Brand had noted that
[i]nformation wants to be free because it has become so cheap to distribute, copy,
and recombine – too cheap to meter. It wants to be expensive because it can be
immeasurably valuable to the recipient. That tension will not go away. It leads to

5

6

7

8

9

ed., 1973).
JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE: WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT MEANS 40–44 (2003)
(explaining these two dimensions).
See ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT
(1965) (the book, right in front, containing a copy of the handwritten excerpt including
Newton’s quotation).
JOHN ZIMAN, PAUL SIEGHART & JOHN HUMPHREY, THE WORLD OF SCIENCE AND THE
RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE OBSERVANCE AND VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF SCIENTISTS IN THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS 41 (1986).
In my own defense, I may refer to John Bohannon, Who’s Downloading Pirated Papers?
Everyone, 352 SCIENCE 508 (Apr. 29, 2016).
Reto M. Hilty, Das Urheberrecht und der Wissenschaftler, 55 GRUR INT’L 179 (2006).
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endless wrenching debate about price, copyright, “intellectual property” [IP], and
the moral rightness of casual distribution, because each round of new devices makes
the tension worse, not better. 10

This is felt even more intensely in the digital age, since digitization now
allows both full access and comprehensive control (via digital fences and
locks). Such comprehensive control has perhaps become the single most
important make-or-break factor for a functional system of science. With the
ratcheting up of global copyright standards that has occurred in the era of
TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights) 11 and TRIPS-plus, some now speak of “a hardly resolvable conflict”
between the interests of science and those of commercial publishing. 12
How can the copyright dilemma in the field of science be resolved? The
question as to how better dissemination of, access to, and use of scholarly
publications might be achieved could be approached in different ways. One
could make an economic argument to the effect that a more open science
yields increased returns to research and development (R&D) expenditure. 13
One could also adopt a more activist A2K approach, arguing that, as an
appropriate response to the demands of the “knowledge economy,”
innovation and development require better “access to knowledge,” including
scientific knowledge. 14 Then one could argue from a Senian “capability
approach,” holding that improved access to scientific information promotes
wider human development and advances human capabilities in a way that
enhances individuals’ freedom to choose their way of life. 15 However, the
approach here will be more decidedly from human rights. The question posed
is whether the right of everyone “to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress
and its applications” (REBSPA) as laid down in Article 15(1)(b) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
of 1966, 16 provides the necessary counterweight to resolve the copyright
dilemma. While broad access, free dissemination, and unrestrained reuse of
10
11

12

13

14

15

16

STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT 202 (1987).
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter TRIPS].
RAFAEL BALL, WISSENSCHAFTSKOMMUNIKATION IM WANDEL: VON GUTENBERG BIS
OPEN SCIENCE 127 (2021).
See, e.g., John W. Houghton & Charles Oppenheim, The Economic Implications of
Alternative Publishing Models, 28 PROMETHEUS 41–54 (2010) (finding that more open
access to research findings leads to “substantial net benefits” in the longer term, including
in the form of returns to R&D).
See, e.g., Ahmed Abdel Latif, The Emergence of the A2K Movement: Reminiscences and
Reflections of a Developing-Country Delegate, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 99 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010)
(articulating the need in global IP law to move from access to medicines to access to
educational material and scientific knowledge).
For the most comprehensive account of Sen’s “capability approach,” see AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 15(1)(b), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
KLAUS D. BEITER
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scientific knowledge naturally follow from the normative structure, that is,
the unwritten laws, of science, the question here is whether these do not also,
more explicitly, flow from a “right to research” under the REBSPA. If so,
what would be the normative content of such a right? Would it be sufficiently
strong to trigger or demand changes to copyright in the field of science?
Valentina Moscon opines that access, dissemination, and reuse are a demand
of the right to scientific/academic freedom, 17 a right which conceptually
implies rather negative obligations under the REBSPA. However, they might
also be subsumed under the right of citizens to benefit from scientific
progress, this being the conceptually more positive element of the REBSPA.
A more open science enhances other researchers’ use of certain literature,
news and social media coverage thereof, possibilities to mine text and data in
commercial and non-commercial research contexts, access to research in the
R&D sector, access for citizen scientists, medical patients, NGOs, lawmakers, and governments, and may thus influence science and socioeconomic policy, lead to further scientific knowledge, and precipitate actual
beneficial applications (notably technology), which can improve the lives of
citizens. 18 Additionally, one may ask, does a “right to research” under the
REBSPA also have extraterritorial applicability? Does it require countries of
the global North to protect access, dissemination, and reuse beyond borders
in countries of the global South?
In a sense, this article seeks to further develop aspects of an earlier article
of this author, published in the Israel Law Review in 2019. 19 This essentially
had sought to provide a blueprint for resolving the natural tension that exists
between the negative and the positive dimension of the REBSPA. The article
was written to influence the drafting of General Comment No. 25 on Science
and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the independent expert body
supervising implementation of the ICESCR. The General Comment was
adopted in April 2020. 20 I had endeavored to argue that, in constructing the
positive dimension of the REBSPA, far greater account needed to be taken of
the negative scientific/academic freedom element than had been done notably
in UNESCO’s Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers of

17

18

19

20

Valentina Moscon, Academic Freedom, Copyright, and Access to Scholarly Works: A
Comparative Perspective, in BALANCING COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 99, 101 (Roberto Caso & Frederica Giovanella eds., 2015).
See Jonathan P. Tennant et al., The Academic, Economic and Societal Impacts of Open
Access: An Evidence-Based Review [version 3; referees: 3 approved, 2 approved with
reservations], 5:632 F1000RESEARCH 1, 1–23 (2016) (describing the various benefits of
OA for science and ultimately citizens).
Klaus D. Beiter, Where Have All the Scientific and Academic Freedoms Gone? And What
Is “Adequate for Science”? – The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and
Its Applications, 52 ISR. L. REV. 233 (2019).
U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 25: Science and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 15(1)(b), (2), (3), and (4) of the ICESCR),
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/25 (Apr. 30, 2020) [hereinafter General Comment No. 25].
WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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2017. 21 Overall, my attempts were not very successful. The Committee
member charged with preparing the draft had explained to me that a separate
General Comment at some future date might address the right to
scientific/academic freedom. 22 Even though the 2020 General Comment, in
its title, claims to also address Article 15(3) of the ICESCR, which protects
“the freedom indispensable for scientific research,” 23 the General Comment
does not deal with scientific/academic freedom issues in depth. The
submission here is that, if not interpreted cautiously, the positive dimension
of the REBSPA may, in “chasing” scientific progress, readily be
implemented in a way that is concomitant with overregulation of science,
bureaucratization, hyper-incentives, productivist agendas, and performatist
attitudes, all detrimental to science. It is these facets that create a (lucrative)
market for scholarly publications in the first place. Commercial publishers
and their governments (most of the publishers based in countries of the global
North), for obvious monetary reasons, support strong (and ever stronger)
copyright laws. 24 The 2019 article had formulated 22 recommendations on
how the REBSPA should be construed so as to duly respect
scientific/academic freedom. Recommendation 21 reads as follows:
The market power and profit margins of commercial scientific publishers need to
be limited. “Publish or perish” … should be terminated, open access publishing
models be promoted, not-for-profit university publishers be well subsidised by
states, publishers be required to pay for peer review, and … far-reaching limitations
and exceptions to copyright protection be enacted to guarantee access to scientific
knowledge. 25

No strong statement of this caliber can be found in the existing
interpretations of the REBSPA. The analysis in what follows will build on
the ideas of Recommendation 21, to assess whether it is correct to say that,
in the digital era, commercial scholarly publishing and the profit motive lie
at the root of the copyright dilemma in science.
The “right to research,” in both its domestic and extraterritorial
dimension, will be constructed on the basis of existing normative documents
relevant to the REBSPA, including General Comment No. 25 and
UNESCO’s Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers of 2017
and that on Open Science of 2021. 26 However, the REBSPA will also be
21

22
23
24

25

26

UNESCO General Conference, Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers,
Doc. 39 C/Res 85 (Nov. 13, 2017) [hereinafter UNESCO Recommendation (2017)].
E-Mail, Mikel Mancisidor de la Fuente (Spain), July 1, 2017, on file with this author.
See supra note 19. ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 15(3).
See, e.g., Philip G. Altbach, The Subtle Inequalities of Copyright, 8(15) THE
ACQUISITIONS LIBRARIAN 17, 20–21 (1996) (“There is a kind of OPEC of knowledge in
which a few rich nations and a small number of multinational publishers have a great deal
of control.”).
Beiter, supra note 18, at 290. “Payment for peer review” was intended as somewhat of a
sarcastic statement here.
General Comment No. 25, supra note 19; UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra
note 20; UNESCO General Conference, Recommendation on Open Science, Doc. 41
C/Res 22 (Nov. 23, 2021) [hereinafter UNESCO Recommendation (2021)]. General
KLAUS D. BEITER
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reinterpreted in accordance with what may be considered a more human
rights-oriented approach. Its guiding concept is that of “adequacy for
science,” borrowed from German law, but developed further. The aim is to
show what, in this writer’s view, is missing from existing interpretations of
the REBSPA, namely, a deeper understanding of the breadth and richness of
the concept of scientific/academic freedom, its normative demands for the
scientific enterprise, and its implications for copyright in the field of science.
Altogether, one could say that the REBSPA will be purposively interpreted
to construct a derivative “new” human right (more on this later).
The article finds that a strong case can be made for a bold “right to
research,” in both its domestic and extraterritorial dimension, under the
REBSPA (and associated rights). This right – with one component focusing
on scientists’ research freedoms, another on citizens’ claims to access
research findings – it is argued, would require copyright law to undergo
certain reforms in the interim to accommodate the needs of science better, for
some time to come. However, in the specific way the right is understood here,
it would further constitute a weighty argument in support of, in the longer
term, entire institutionalized science being reconceived, science becoming
genuinely open, and a “true” scholarly knowledge commons being created.
This would mandate a largely reduced role for the scholarly publishers and
far-reaching changes in the way copyright applies in the sphere of science.
Section I will outline the deficiencies of existing copyright law, also from
a North-South perspective, detail three possible future scenarios for copyright
and the role of the commercial scholarly publishers (a “milder” subscription
model with a clear role for the commercial scholarly publishers, open access,
also with a clear role for them, and “genuine” open access with a new,
reduced role for the publishers), and enquire as to the “value added” by the
scholarly publishing industry to research in the digital era. Section II will then
define the REBSPA, (re)interpret this in the light of the “adequacy” concept,
and construct the domestic and extraterritorial “right to research.” Section III
will provide an indication of the changes that are mandated by the “right to
research” in the field of copyright and digital science, both in the short or
medium and in the long term – hence, explain which one or more of the three
scenarios for copyright and the role of the commercial scholarly publishers
should prevail. The discussion here cannot make a full-fledged international
law argument of the exact changes needed. That would have to be part of a
subsequent analysis.
“Science,” in this article and as internationally understood, refers to the
organized attempt of individuals or groups to objectively study any field of
knowledge, including the humanities and social sciences (economics,
education, history, law, linguistics, philosophy, politics, psychology, and so

Comment No. 25, as a synthesis document, is relied on in lieu of the CESCR’s
Concluding Observations, which assess individual states parties’ compliance with
Covenant rights as part of the state report procedure.
WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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on), in which theoretical elements are capable of being validated. 27
I. EXISTING COPYRIGHT LAW AND SCIENCE, POSSIBLE FUTURE
SCENARIOS, AND THE SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING INDUSTRY
A. The Deficiencies of Existing Copyright Law and North-South
Justice
The research needs of scientists need to be taken seriously as the scientist
stands at the center of any research and innovation system that is to yield
knowledge which advances society. Yet, already in the analogue era
copyright posed certain obstacles to research. The Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, still in its 1948 Brussels version,
had, in Article 10(2), allowed members, by way of legislation, to provide for
“the right to include excerpts from literary or artistic works in educational or
scientific publications … in so far as this inclusion is justified by its
purpose.” 28 While the limited nature of the provision is clear, members at the
time, even so, tried to “squeeze” early limitations and exceptions (L&Es) for
science into it. 29 However, “science” was deleted from this provision in 1971.
It was now considered that the general reproduction right of Article 9(1)
would sufficiently deal with research needs. 30 Article 9(2) however
introduced the (in)famous three-step test for permissible reproductions. 31
With the subjection of all L&Es to the three-step test under TRIPS 32 and
trends of a(n) (unjustifiably) strict interpretation of that test, 33 the utilization
of works for research purposes can hardly be claimed to enjoy the legal
standing it should to further science. 34 Many countries adopted a “private
use” exception, permitting, for example, limited copies for non-commercial

27

28

29

30

31
32

33

34

See, notably, UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 1(a) (definition of
“science,” “sciences”).
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 10(2), Sept. 9,
1886, revised at Brussels June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Aug. 1,
1951).
See Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law and Science Collide:
Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a Global Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV.
1362, 1378 (2012) (making this point).
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 9(1), Sept. 9,
1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 15, 1972),
and amended Sept. 28, 1979 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
Id. Art. 9(2).
See TRIPS, supra note 10, Art. 13 (“Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder.”).
See Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths, Reto M. Hilty et al., Declaration on a
Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 711 (Preamble) (2008) (“national courts and
legislatures have been wrongly influenced by restrictive interpretations of that Test”)
[hereinafter Geiger et al., Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step
Test in Copyright Law].
Superbly describing the state of affairs, see the thorough analysis by Reichman &
Okediji, supra note 28.
KLAUS D. BEITER
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research purposes. 35 Private copying is sometimes made a remunerated
L&E. 36 There may be library L&Es allowing uses toward the preservation or
replacement of works or copying for researchers. 37 A common L&E is further
that which allows non-commercial “use for the sole purpose of illustration
for teaching or scientific research.” Use may only be “to the extent justified
by the … purpose.” 38 If in this L&E, “for the sole purpose of illustration” is
read to apply not only to “teaching,” but also to “scientific research,” then the
L&E is quite limited and does not facilitate proper utilization of a work for
research. Restricting use to just “non-commercial” purposes is questionable
too, as universities these days – whether desirable or not – have become
quasi-commercial actors. 39 In the United States and other countries that
follow the “fair use” doctrine in copyright, public research fares quite well in
the analogue context. Research uses in this respect would often be considered
transformative in nature, as advancing the public interest, and thus covered
by fair use. 40
While the First Scientific Revolution (Science 1.0) is associated with the
development of the publishing system for printed works, the Second
Scientific Revolution (Science 2.0) refers to science facilitated by digitization
and the internet, e-science. E-science can, but need not be open. 41 At its best,
it is characterized by enormous data storage capacities, the application of
various computational methods of data analysis and manipulation, digitally
networked communities of scientists, and open repositories of scientific
data. 42 However, copyright problems have become much more acute in the
digital and e-science era. Printed scholarly literature is physically sold to
research institutions. As a consequence, many of the right-holders’ copyright
entitlements are considered exhausted on first sale. For as long as this was
the essential way libraries acquired literature, this arrangement substantially
facilitated the use of works by scientists. Digital works, however, are
commonly kept behind a paywall and then licensed to (for example) libraries.
35

36

37

38
39

40
41

42

Daniel Seng, Educational Activities Copyright Exceptions: Typology Analysis, WIPO,
Standing Comm. on Copyright and Related Rights, SCCR/38/8, 5 (Mar. 29, 2019).
See specifically Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights
in the Information Society, (2001) O.J. (L 167) 10, Art. 5(2)(a), (b) (photocopying and
other private copying to be remunerated) [hereinafter Infosoc Directive).
Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries: Typology
Analysis, WIPO, Standing Comm. on Copyright and Related Rights, SCCR/38/4, 6–8
(Mar. 29, 2019).
See Infosoc Directive, supra note 35, Art. 5(3)(a) (providing for this L&E).
See also Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1381–82 (raising similar points of
criticism).
Id. at 1384–87.
See Sönke Bartling & Sascha Friesike, Towards Another Scientific Revolution, in
OPENING SCIENCE: THE EVOLVING GUIDE ON HOW THE INTERNET IS CHANGING
RESEARCH, COLLABORATION AND SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING 3 (Sönke Bartling & Sascha
Friesike eds., 2014) (on the First and Second Scientific Revolution, Science 2.0, and
Open Access).
See Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1366–67.
WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Their utilization is subject to the perpetual contractual control of publishers.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) World Copyright
Treaty (WCT) of 1996, one of the so-called internet treaties, bestows on the
copyright-holder of a digital work the exclusive right to communicate that
work to the public by wire or wireless means. 43 In consequence, with libraries
intending to do exactly that, the lending and terms of use of such works are
subject to the stipulations of the publisher. Copyright law is increasingly read
not to cover an L&E permitting digital lending by libraries. 44 In many
countries, digital library uses are further limited to the premises of the
institution concerned. This proved a serious obstacle during the Covid-19
pandemic where researchers had to work remotely. 45 Payment of licensing
fees remains a continuous obligation. While library budgets remain stagnant,
prices for digital scholarly products have increased at astronomical rates. 46
Hence, subscription fees for journals have outpaced inflation at 250% in the
last thirty years. 47
It has also become customary – with many copyright systems
countenancing this – for publishers to summarily render L&Es that were
available in the analogue era inapplicable contractually. Digital rights
management (DRM) tools are now combined with technological protection
measures (TPMs), making it impossible to access or use scholarly literature
in accordance with legitimate research needs. Copyright law forbids the
circumvention of TPMs, sometimes even stipulating criminal sanctions. 48
Furthermore, as pointed out, science has changed with the advent of new
research technologies. It is possible now to rely on facilities that permit
browsing, analyzing, and manipulating huge amounts of digital text or data
within seconds. “Text and data mining” (TDM), as this is called, requires
reproductions to be made at various points. 49 It is not clear, however, whether
43

44

45

46

47

48

49

WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 (entered into force
Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter WCT].
See Giorgio Spedicato, Digital Lending and Public Access to Knowledge, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO IM/MATERIAL GOODS 149 (Jessica C. Lai &
Antoinette Maget Dominicé eds., 2016) (observing this development in Europe and
criticizing it).
See Statement on Copyright and Proposal of a Waiver from Certain Provisions of the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement for the
Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19 (IP/C/W/669) (Mar. 22, 2021),
http://infojustice.org/archives/43020 (drawing attention to this problem).
See Peter Weingart, On the Situation and Development of Academic Libraries, in THE
FUTURE OF SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING: OPEN ACCESS AND THE ECONOMICS OF
DIGITISATION 95, 96 (Peter Weingart & Niels Taubert eds., 2017) (“an aggressive policy
regarding prices”).
According
to
“Open
Access,”
Electronic
Frontier
Foundation,
https://www.eff.org/issues/open-access (last visited on Mar. 31, 2022).
For a discussion of the problem of TPMs in relation to science (focusing on the E.U.
context), see Reto Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, in COPYRIGHT LAW: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 315 (Paul Torremans ed., 2007).
Hence, temporary copies are made during any query of a database. More permanent
copies are necessary to construct any database to be mined. Copies of a database itself
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current copyright L&Es would permit this. 50 Added to this, there is a
legitimate need to mine text or data that may not have been ordinarily licensed
to a research institution. The WCT, in its preamble, recognizes the need to
protect the public interest in “education, research and access to
information.” 51 Yet, the treaty does not add special L&Es in the field of
science. It repeats the three-step test of Berne and TRIPS. 52
Although the discussion here focuses on scholarly publishing, a few
comments on sui generis database protection rights are in order – ultimately,
also a collection of journal articles could qualify for separate database
protection. The notorious blueprint for legal protection in this regard is the
European Union’s (EU) Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases of
1996. 53 While copyright law itself offers limited protection for databases –
because the selection or arrangement of their contents must be original 54 –
the Directive accords automatic protection by virtue of “substantial
investment” related to a database having been effected. Protection is for a
period of fifteen years and, unlike in the case of copyright law, starts to run
anew once a “substantial change” to the database has been made. 55 L&Es
may (but need not) cover the extraction of “substantial parts” “for the
purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research … to the extent
justified by the non-commercial purpose to be achieved.” 56 Clearly, database
protection is problematic. It may restrict access to, and use of, many scientific
datasets and make them the object of commercial exploitation to the
detriment of science. Database protection further often accords protection to
ideas rather than expression and to other materials that, from a copyright
perspective, fall into the public domain. 57
If scientists’ unfettered access to, and use of, scholarly literature is the
one side of the medal, then the ability of each scientist to make available their
published research in a way that others can access and use it without problems

50

51
52
53

54
55
56

57

may be necessary to permit other researchers’ use thereof, including for replicability
tests: see Sean Flynn, Christophe Geiger & Joao P. Quintais et al., Implementing User
Rights for Research in the Field of Artificial Intelligence: A Call for International Action,
42 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 393, 394 (2020).
As Jerome Reichman and Ruth Okediji explain, one way of seeing this is to argue that,
by virtue of the comprehensive use of information which TDM entails by scientists as
the primary market of published scientific works, TDM constitutes an instrument of
“massive infringement” of copyright: Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1412,
1426–28.
WCT, supra note 42, Preamble, Recital 5.
Id. Art. 10(1).
Directive 96/9/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on
the Legal Protection of Databases, (1996) O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter Database Directive].
To this effect, see TRIPS, supra note 10, Art. 10(2); WCT, supra note 42, Art. 5.
Database Directive, supra note 52, Arts. 7(1), 10(1), (3).
Id. Art. 9(b). The sporadic extraction and re-utilization of “insubstantial parts,” also for
research purposes, is permissible: id. Arts. 7(5), 8(1).
For a discussion and related criticism of the Directive, see Reichman & Okediji, supra
note 28, at 1414–25.
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is the other side of it. However, in exchange for the opportunity to publish in
a journal with a high impact factor – most of these paywalled and held by
commercial publishers – authors are willing to either assign their copyright
or license significant entitlements to the publishers. 58 (However, authors have
been willing to do so readily for monographs too.) Publishers will publish
and distribute authors’ works. While digital fences and locks will restrain
access and use by others, authors themselves lose many of their rights too –
rights to republish or otherwise reuse their work (e.g., in another publication
or a presentation), to distribute it (e.g., for teaching in a classroom setting),
to produce derivative works thereof (e.g., adaptations, translations,
abridgements, or condensations) – all acts that would enhance dissemination
of a work. The author might for that reason prefer to publish “open access”
(OA). In this instance, in accordance with “the author pays” principle,
commonly applicable in the case of OA publishing, the author could – against
payment (for articles often in the form of so-called “Article Processing
Charges” (APCs)) – potentially retain copyright. As for commercial
publishers, fees or charges can be prohibitively high, beyond the ability of
the author or even their institution, where these commit to pay. 59
Research findings, as has been explained above, need to be validated
universally before they can be considered to constitute new knowledge. In
other words, the global South would have to be fully engaged in scholarly
communication processes across borders toward this end, for its own findings
to achieve universal validity and those of the global North as well. This
presupposes the free flow of scientific information on a transboundary scale.
“[U]nduly strong copyright rules” would not only impede this endeavor, but
– as already pointed out by the famous 2002 Report of the U.K. Commission
on Intellectual Property Rights – they also prevent affordable access to
scientific works essential for development in countries of the global South. 60
The report thus refers to the problem of paywalls for development. 61
Similarly, it states that development through research is stifled by TPMs,
supplemented by contract law allowing legitimate uses of works to be
excluded, and sui generis database protection (which the E.U. compels
developing countries to emulate), these measures effectively restricting forms

58

59

60

61

Marco Bellia & Valentina Moscon, Academic Authors, Copyright and Dissemination of
Knowledge: A Comparative Overview 11–12 (Max Planck Inst. for Innov. &
Competition, Research Paper No. 21-27, 2021).
See Weingart, supra note 45, at 106 (“In recent years, the APCs have increased
significantly.”); David J. Solomon & Bo-Christer Björk, A Study of Open Access Journals
Using Article Processing Charges, 63 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1485, 1485
(2012) (“The average APC was $906 U.S. dollars (USD) calculated over journals and
$904 USD calculated over articles. The price range varied between $8 and $3,900
USD.”).
COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS. (CIPR), INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 18 (Sept. 2002 Report of the U.K. CIPR, 3d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report].
Id. at 100.
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of fair use. 62 Joe Karaganis observes that, differential pricing benefiting
developing countries notwithstanding, “these practices also produce a system
that operates at the edge of affordability for all players.” 63 Moreover, insofar
as OA publishing is concerned, UNESCO’s Recommendation on Open
Science of 2021 notes that “increased costs for scientists and high article
processing charges associated with certain business models in scientific
publishing … may be causes of inequality for the scientific communities
around the world.” 64 Finally, countries of the global South are likely to
experience a need for bulk access to scientific works, that is, for original
language or translated versions of whole works for use by a large number of
institutions or users. The Appendix to the Berne Convention, adopted by
states in 1971, provides for a compulsory licensing scheme that may be
applied by developing countries, permitting translation and/or reproduction
of a (whole) work against compensation without the consent of the copyright
holder, for defined purposes, if a translation of a work does not exist or if a
work has not been distributed in a country at a reasonable price. While the
Appendix could have been a good solution for scientific works, there are a
number of problems. First, reproduction licenses can only be obtained “in
connection with systematic instructional activities.” 65 This excludes licenses
for scientific works. 66 Translation licenses, however, can be obtained “for the
purpose of teaching, scholarship or research.” 67 Second, the Appendix was
drafted in the analogue era. While Alberto Cerda Silva correctly points out
that there are many arguments why the Appendix may well be held to be
applicable to digital works too, most commentators hold that it does not.68

62

Id.
Joe Karaganis, Introduction: Access from Above, Access from Below, in SHADOW
LIBRARIES: ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN GLOBAL HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 12 (Joe
Karaganis ed., 2018).
64
UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, ¶ 20. See also Suzanne Day et al.,
Open to the Public: Paywalls and the Public Rationale for Open Access Medical
Research Publishing, 6:8 RES. INVOLVEM. & ENGAGEM. 1, 5 (2020) (“potential to create
a two-tiered system … entrenches the dominance of scientific outputs from richer
countries”); Alf Butenschøn Skre & Asbjørn Eide, The Human Right to Benefit from
Advances in Science and Promotion of Openly Accessible Publications, 31 NORD. J.
HUM. RTS. 427, 445 (2013) (“could … relegate researchers in materially speaking less
resourceful countries”).
65
Berne Convention, supra note 29, app. Art. III(2)(a).
66
SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING
RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶ 14.86 (2d ed., 2006).
67
Berne Convention, supra note 29, app. Art. II(5). It may be noted in this respect that
neither Berne, the WCT, nor TRIPS provide explicit L&Es for translation, also not in the
research context. Translation L&Es for research purposes would thus have to be implied
within the respective limits of the reproduction or other relevant L&Es: see RICKETSON
& GINSBURG, supra note 65, ¶ 13.83 (making this argument for L&Es for translation in
Berne generally). For an instructive discussion of Berne translation rights, L&Es, and the
Appendix provisions, see CHAMILA S. TALAGALA, COPYRIGHT LAW AND TRANSLATION:
ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 126–55 (2021).
68
For detail in this regard, see Alberto J. Cerda Silva, Beyond the Unrealistic Solution
for Development Provided by the Appendix of the Berne Convention on Copyright, 60 J.
63
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Third, the Appendix has for many reasons been a failure (e.g., long waiting
periods or the requirement of first seeking consent) and has, therefore, not
been made use of by many countries. 69 Consequently, while digital
connectivity offers enormous opportunities for development through research
in developing countries, restrictive copyright law at this point rather
exacerbates the digital divide between the North and the South.
B. Three Possible Future Scenarios for Copyright
Addressing the needs of the research community and the wider public,
any one (or the first two jointly) of the following three scenarios for copyright
and the role of the commercial scholarly publishers could, in principle,
prevail, each in the nature of a model of reform of copyright:
1. A “Milder” Subscription Model: In the subscription (also “toll
access” (TA)) model, access to journal content is restricted to those that
subscribe to and pay for the content. In the print world, access is
accomplished by physically handing over journal issues. In the digital world,
authentication mechanisms allow paying subscribers to access digital
content. This model is associated with journals publishing a certain number
of issues with a clearly limited number of pages in any year. While, in the
print era, this restriction also had to do with “physical” restraints of space,
the restriction, according to orthodox dogma, serves another important
purpose. It means that, from among the many article submissions received by
a journal, not only those that are “scientifically valid,” but also only those
“with impact” should be selected for publication. 70 The result hereof is that
the peer review process becomes a powerful tool in the hands of journals. The
higher the rejection rate for articles and the stricter the choice of only those
articles that will yield many citations by other researchers, the higher a
journal’s “impact factor” will be. 71 Traditionalists say that this mechanism
serves to ensure quality in science. Yet, it is also true that, the higher the JIF,
the higher the subscription rate a publisher can charge academic libraries for
the journal. 72 The more “high impact” journals a publisher holds, the greater

COPY. SOC’Y U.S.A. 581, 607–12 (2013).
69

70

71

72

For an excellent discussion in this regard, see Silva’s article: id. “[T]he Appendix comes
across as an obsolete, inappropriate, bureaucratic, and extremely limited attempt to
provide an air valve for developing countries.”: id. at 590.
See Peter Binfield, Novel Scholarly Journal Concepts, in OPENING SCIENCE: THE
EVOLVING GUIDE ON HOW THE INTERNET IS CHANGING RESEARCH, COLLABORATION
AND SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, supra note 40, at 155, 157–58 (mentioning these two
functions of traditional peer review).
The Thomson-Reuters, now Clarivate, JIF means the average number of times articles
from a specific journal published in the past two years have been cited in the calculation
year.
See INTERACADEMY PARTNERSHIP, COMBATTING PREDATORY ACADEMIC JOURNALS
AND CONFERENCES 62 (InterAcademy Partnership, 2022) (“the highest impact factor
journals … the most expensive in terms of annual subscription fees” [hereinafter
COMBATTING PREDATORY ACADEMIC JOURNALS].
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its economic bargaining power. 73 The subscription model is for this reason
very attractive to the commercial publishers. For books, mechanisms may be
somewhat different. Yet, also here peer review, (supposed) quality, and
economic power (the latter often associated with a publisher’s journals) will
determine prices. As described under the previous heading, in this model
authors will often hand over their copyright to publishers and lose many of
their entitlements to use and reuse their own works. 74
One might argue that the subscription model has largely served science
well, but that the obvious copyright restrictions it produces for the
dissemination of, access to, and use of scholarly information need to be
addressed. New copyright L&Es could be created, or existing ones widened,
to promote the best interests of science. This could cover more generous
entitlements, for research purposes, to reproduce, format-shift, quote, adapt,
translate, or distribute works or parts thereof. It could also encompass clear
entitlements for libraries to deal with works in the endeavor of creating and
maintaining an adequate research environment (preserving, replacing,
copying for users, on and off-premise access, and so on). A specific TDM
exception could be designed. Additionally, the contractual evasion of L&Es
should be forbidden. As far as possible, TPMs for digital media should be
avoided as regards scientific literature. As appropriate, their circumvention
should be allowed and, at any rate, may never be criminalized. Moreover,
prices for access should be controlled. A statutory body could suggest, or lay
down binding, general maximum charges. A tribunal could be granted the
competence, on application, to rule that certain fees are “unreasonable.”
Competition law might be applied to hold that prices are excessive.
Compulsory licenses might even be granted to force publishers to open their
content to other publishers. Finally, contract law can constitute an appropriate
instrument to ensure authors will retain adequate rights to use and reuse their
own works.
In this model, it should be noted, commercial scholarly publishers retain
their “traditional” role of being the most important – and a powerful –
intermediary between academic author and the public. This is a consequence
of the subscription model’s potential for enormous profits.
2. Gold/Green Open Access (Open Access “Light”) and a Clear Role
for Commercial Scholarly Publishers: In this model, access is not dependent
on the payment of an access fee. Here access to digital media is free for the
public. Open access follows from either publication in an OA journal (golden
OA path) or the self-archiving of works in an OA subject or institutional
repository (green OA path). 75

73

74
75

See Weingart, supra note 45, at 98 (explaining this connection between the JIF and
economic power).
See supra Section I.A., notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
For good descriptions of the golden and green OA paths, see, e.g., David Ball, Open
Access: Effects on Publishing Behaviour of Scientists, Peer Review and Interrelations
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In the golden path, the author customarily grants a publisher the nonexclusive license to publish a work and communicate it to the public. The
publisher publishes the work “open access,” that is, freely available online
for the public, and deposits it in an online archive. The author retains the
copyright and (may) grant(s) an open content license facilitating wide use of
the work by the public. Very often, the Creative Commons Licenses are used
to this end. 76 A journal may also be “mixed” in nature in that publication by
default occurs in the TA mode, but that the OA mode may be negotiated for
individual articles. L&Es retain their relevance in this path. The OA mode
entails free consumption by the public, use in accordance with existing L&Es,
and, beyond this, use as permitted under an open content license. 77 Enacting
new or wider copyright L&Es remains important therefore, as the scope of
permitted uses under a license is ultimately contractually negotiated. OA
publishing is financed in various ways. Notably, authors are required to pay
APCs. Additional funds may flow from advertising, sponsorships, or the sales
of print copies. OA journals can also be free for authors. Clearly, high APCs
would be problematic for authors and their research institutions.
The green path is essentially directed at subscription articles. Authors
deposit these in an OA archive. As copyright has been handed over to the
publisher, authors’ right of deposit needs to be granted by the publisher.
Publishers often set embargo periods of 6 to 12 months. They further do not
allow the archiving of articles in their published format. 78 To secure the
author’s legal position, it is advisable for legislation to grant authors an
inalienable right to self-archive, also restricting embargo periods to a
minimum. Self-archiving does not require separate peer review. This has
with Performance Measures, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING: OPEN ACCESS
ECONOMICS OF DIGITISATION, supra note 45, at 165–98; Lucie Guibault,
Owning the Right to Open Up Access to Scientific Publications, in OPEN CONTENT
LICENSING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 137–67 (Lucie Guibault & Christina
Angelopoulos eds., 2011); HEATHER MORRISON, SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION FOR
LIBRARIANS, esp. Ch. 6 (2009).
The basic Creative Commons Licenses are: Attribution CC BY – use and dissemination
allowed, subject to crediting the author; Attribution-NonCommercial CC BY-NC – as for
the first license, however only non-commercial purposes are covered; AttributionNoDerivs CC BY-ND – as for the first license, however no derivate works may be
produced and distributed; Attribution-ShareAlike CC BY-SA – as for the first license,
however derivate works must bear the same license as the initial work; and as
combinations of the previous, Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike CC BY-NC-SA
and Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. There is also an option No
Copyright: Public Domain CC0 – copyright is waived. For a summary of all these, see
Sascha Friesike, Creative Commons Licences, in OPENING SCIENCE: THE EVOLVING
GUIDE ON HOW THE INTERNET IS CHANGING RESEARCH, COLLABORATION AND
SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, supra note 40, at 287–88.
OA in a comprehensive sense, therefore, means not only gratis access, but also libre
access, that is, access (largely) free from copyright/licensing restrictions.
“Pale green” limits self-archiving to pre-prints only (articles prior to peer review);
“dotted, or some form of mitigated green” limits self-archiving to post-prints (articles
after peer review); and “solid green” allows self-archiving of both pre-prints and postprints: Guibault, supra note 74, at 156.
AND THE

76

77

78
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usually already been completed for the subscription publication. Archiving
entails limited costs relating to establishing and maintaining a repository
only. While gold OA can also be applied to books, green OA is normally only
intended for articles. Access to archived articles is gratis, but usually not
libre. Hence, enacting new or wider copyright L&Es remains important also
in this instance. Additionally, contract law constitutes an appropriate
instrument to protect authors’ rights to use and reuse their own works.
The European Commission recommends and many governments require
scientists to make scholarly publications resulting wholly or partially from
publicly-funded research available open access. Many funding agencies and
research institutions nowadays mandate OA availability. 79 OA journals are
often falsely associated with no or inadequate peer review. There is no basis
for this view. Open access relates to access, not the absence of peer review.
There is no reason why peer review would be better or worse than in the case
of subscription journals. As has been held, open access is “agnostic” insofar
as peer review is concerned. 80 What is true is that, while in the case of the
subscription journals published for profit, there is a financial incentive to
reject articles in high impact journals (and yet to accept many of the rejected
articles in lower impact journals, often even those held by the same
commercial publisher), there is, in the case of OA journals, an obvious
financial incentive to accept as many articles as possible for publication,
namely, “the author pays” principle! In the current science environment to
which researchers are exposed, this is a factor spurring predatory publishing
practices. 81
Also in this model commercial scholarly publishers retain their
“traditional” role as powerful and most important intermediary between
academic author and the public. Also here there are enormous profits to be
made. Ultimately, the green OA path is primarily directed at subscription
articles. In the golden OA path, high APCs can be charged. Even if the
copyright here vests in the author, its de facto monopoly remains intact for
publishers, essentially because gold OA is contractually agreed. It exists “at
the mercy” of publishers.
3. Genuine Open Access (Open Access 2.0) – Another Science and a
New World of Scholarly Publishing: One could, however, also make more
radical demands for “genuine” open access. In this third model, authors and

79

80
81

As will be explained below, such policies or laws can at most be considered “green.” See
infra Section II.D., notes 298–302 and accompanying text.
Ball, supra note 74, at 184.
See COMBATTING PREDATORY ACADEMIC JOURNALS, supra note 71, at 63 (“the authorpays model of OA is particularly prone to abuse and thus vulnerable to predatory
incursion”); THOMAS EGER & MARC SCHEUFEN, THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN ACCESS: ON
THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC PUBLISHING 109 (2018) (explaining that, in order to increase
the subscription rate, a journal would have to improve its quality by restricting article
acceptance; for an OA journal to increase profits, it could reduce quality and increase
quantity, in the extreme become a predatory journal).
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research institutions regain “ownership” over their articles, journals, books,
and book series. Hence, “a university may host and publish an open access
journal, and task its researchers and other staff to perform editorial and
administrative tasks for the journal.” 82 Copyright would not vest in
publishers. Authors would be enabled, and agree, to publish open access, to
make their research freely available online for everyone globally without
undue restrictions. Publishers would not require reimbursement based on
copyright or a de facto copyright monopoly. Publication may occur with or
without the infrastructure, facilities, or technical support of publishers,
whether commercial, or learned society or university-based. They may thus
assist with copy-editing, lay-out, production, circulation and indexing. In this
conception, a new, reduced role is envisaged for the scholarly publishers.
They (may) contribute to producing a certain product, but they do not hold
proprietary rights in that product. Their reimbursement is based on delivering
a service. 83 As the enormous profit potential would thus fall away,
commercial publishing, in its current form, would lose its lucrativeness. Two
subtypes of the model are discernible. In the first, copyright continues to
apply in the world of science, but its default positions are contractually
modified to make the model work. In the second, copyright is dispensed
with. 84 Overall, the third model would remove most or all copyright restraints
to the dissemination of, access to, and use of scholarly publications.
Arguments to the effect that this model would likely fail because any
research institution or institutionalized science simply lacks sufficient
financial, human, and time resources to properly assume the publishing task
may not be irrelevant at this point. However, if “industrial science” were
pushed back, 85 this would free the required resources. Jerome Reichman and
Ruth Okediji argue:
Scientists, in short, will increasingly have to manage their own upstream research
assets as global public goods, sheltering them within a reinvigorated sharing ethos,
in the interests of a more productive downstream innovation system otherwise
driven by the incentives of industrial property laws. 86

In the long run, the management of created academic knowledge would
become the responsibility of research institutions and libraries jointly
(consortia of actors) and ultimately that of scientific communities as a whole.
Journals would become mega journals and would be integrated into, or even
merge with, huge subject archives. 87
82
83

84

85
86
87

Skre & Eide, supra note 63, at 446.
In this sense, see also Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1466 (while publishers may
charge for their “technical services,” there is no longer a justification for granting them
“exclusive rights” to downstream uses of the “scientific product”).
It is important to understand that doing away with copyright is not the same as not
protecting authors’ rights in scholarly publishing. On this point, see infra Section III.B.,
notes 403–06 and accompanying text.
The case for “another science” is made further below: see infra Sections II.C. & III.B.
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1459.
On the future of scholarly publishing, see also infra Section III.B.
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The third model is based on the assumption that science is a public
good. 88 Science, which is directed at the discovery of “the truth,” yields
knowledge of such importance to the progress of society and the betterment
of each individual’s life, that each capable person must, on the basis of
equality, be allowed to contribute to science (as a qualified or even citizen
scientist) and to benefit from its achievements. Moreover – and certainly
where science is publicly funded, whether in universities, non-university
research institutes, or commercial enterprises 89 – research findings must be
openly shared with the scientific community and the public. Consequently,
in this model it would be necessary to redesign authors’ rights and strictly
limit the customary interests of the commercial publishers. As it were, the
entire organization of science would have to be placed on a new footing. The
IP claims of the scholarly publishing industry – effectively precipitating the
privatization of research findings – are directly linked to an increasingly
commercialized science system. Governments deliberately underfund and
simultaneously artificially incentivize science (competition for research
funding at all levels), introducing a business analogy to the organization of
science. Two notable features of “new public management” (NPM) in science
are the installation of administrative hierarchy (top-down or line
management) and science evaluation (audit culture, performance
management), directed at increasing “research output,” including
publications. 90 “High impact” publications, but also long publication lists,
become the currency for good evaluations, avoiding teaching-only contracts,
continued employment, promotion, and the award of research funding.
Governments continuously decrease their direct funding for research.
Nowadays, most research is funded competitively. In national research
assessment exercises, funding bids to research councils, and competition for
research contracts, scientists will now have to satisfy their (potential) funders
through publications. This is the foundation of the “publish or perish”
ideology in science. It creates an artificial market for scholarly publications,
where more is published than is good for science and alleged quality and
impact become conflated and confused with marketability, profits, and the
economic power (and IP rights) of publishers. Not only does science not
benefit from such a design, it is effectively damaged.

88

89

90

This point is uncontested these days: see, e.g., Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at
1459 (“upstream research assets as global public goods”); Skre & Eide, supra note 63, at
430 (“the right to benefit from progress in science and technology is … a public good”);
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, Preamble, Recital 4(a) (“science as a
common good”); UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, Preamble,
Recital 11 (“science as a common good”).
On this differentiation (also followed in this article), reflective of the increasing degree
to which an “impact agenda” may legitimately be pursued, see Beiter, supra note 18, at
244, 255–58.
For a detailed account of NPM in science, see, e.g., ROSEMARY DEEM, SAM HILLYARD
& MIKE REED, KNOWLEDGE, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND THE NEW MANAGERIALISM: THE
CHANGING MANAGEMENT OF UK UNIVERSITIES (2007).
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The literature frequently emphasizes the need for copyright reforms on
the understanding that the first two models will continue to be operational,
alongside each other, at least for some time to come. Hence, the need for a
comprehensive research exception has been expressed. 91 In the context of the
increased reliance on computational methods in research, this must cover the
right to carry out text and data mining. 92 Others have lauded legislative
provisions adopted in certain countries which create a right for authors to
have their scholarly articles published open access via the green mode if the
research was funded (in part, at least) by public money. 93 An interesting
suggestion has been made, envisaging automatic OA of academics’ scientific
works against fair compensation for publishers by research institutions and
funders, which is organized collectively. 94 In terms of the models above, this
last model would probably have to be considered a further development of
model 2, that is, perhaps a model “3 minus.” The element of negotiation is
retained at least insofar as publishers’ compensation is concerned. A fairly
“stable” position of commercial publishers seems to be supposed to remain
intact. Initial ideas in the sphere of model 3, questioning the “traditional” role
of (especially the commercial) scholarly publishers, have also been
articulated by some. 95
C. Any “Value Added” by the Scholarly Publishing Industry in the
Digital Era?
The scholarly publishing industry has been making “obscene” profits in
the digital era. 96 With profit margins around 30 percent at the turn of the
century, some of the big players in the field now have profit margins of over

91

92

93

94

95

96

See, e.g., Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1439 (“adopt a broad and
uncompromising exemption for scientific uses”); see esp. Part II of the article.
See, e.g., Flynn et al., supra note 48, at 393 (indicating that there is a need for “WIPO …
guidance on the diverse mechanisms that countries may use to authorise TDM research”).
See, e.g., Dirk Visser, The Open Access Provision in Dutch Copyright Contract Law, 10
J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 872 (2015) (referring to such provisions in the Netherlands
and Germany). Broadly arguing in support of an “improved” model 2, see MARC
SCHEUFEN, COPYRIGHT VERSUS OPEN ACCESS: ON THE ORGANISATION AND
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (2015).
See JOHN WILLINSKY, COPYRIGHT’S BROKEN PROMISE: HOW TO RESTORE THE LAW’S
ABILITY TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE, esp. Ch. 6 (forthcoming) (proposing
this approach).
See, e.g., Moscon, supra note 16, at 128–29 (suggesting that one might abolish the
economic rights of copyright); Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, Part III (proposing a
move toward digital open-knowledge environments managed by institutionalized
science); Steven Shavell, Should Copyright of Academic Works Be Abolished?, 2 J.
LEGAL ANAL. 301, 301 (2010) (“ending academic copyright would be socially
desirable”).
“The Obscene Profits of Commercial Scholarly Publishers,” SV-POW! (blog: Mike
Taylor, Matt Wedel & Darren Naish) (Jan. 13, 2012), https://svpow.com/2012/01/13/theobscene-profits-of-commercial-scholarly-publishers (last visited on Mar. 31, 2022).
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40 percent. 97 Average profit margins across other industries lie at 7 percent.98
How then are these enormous profit margins possible? Already in 2006, 62%
of academic journals were either commercially owned or commercially
published society journals. 99 Five publishers – Elsevier, Springer, Wiley,
Taylor & Francis, and SAGE – jointly, published more than 50% of all papers
in 2013. 100 If one further considers that research libraries seek to offer
complete collections to their users and that the respective publications are
not, in competition law terms, ‘substitutable’, then it becomes quite clear that
the commercial scholarly publishing market has an oligopolistic structure
facilitating excessive pricing. 101 Additionally, secrecy clauses often forbid
details of subscription deals with the big players being disclosed to the public.
This in turn facilitates another anticompetitive practice, price
discrimination. 102
The situation for scholarly articles and journals is indeed “grotesque”: It
is faculty who do the research, write articles, referee texts by other
researchers, and serve on editorial boards. They do all of this for free, as it
were, the public pays. 103 Yet, the libraries of research institutions buy back
the results of faculty’s labor at high prices, the public paying a second time
for the same content. Added to this, research institutions enter into licensing
agreements with collecting societies, undertaking to pay for various uses of
works, for instance, the reproduction of articles for research purposes or
inclusion in student course packs, this often paid out of tuition fees, the public
hence paying a third time. 104 Copyright and its perpetual pervasiveness in
relation to digital media make this possible. At the same time, the public thus
massively subsidizing private industry, universities and research institutes are
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Id.; MORRISON, supra note 73, Ch. 4 (on scholarly publishing and “the multi-billiondollar industry”); Jon Tennant, Elsevier Are Corrupting Open Science in Europe, THE
GUARDIAN
(June 29,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/politicalscience/2018/jun/29/elsevier-are-corrupting-open-science-in-europe
(“With
profit
margins around 37%, larger than Apple and big oil companies”).
“What Is a Good Profit Margin? Industry Averages and How to Improve Yours,” Brex
(financial advice company) (July 30, 2020), https://www.brex.com/blog/what-is-a-goodprofit-margin (last visited on Mar. 31, 2022).
See MORRISON, supra note 74, at 37 (citing figures provided by scholarly publishing
expert Raym Crow in 2006: commercially owned journals – 45 per cent, commercially
published society journals – 17 per cent, self-published society journals – 23 per cent,
university sponsored journals – 15 per cent).
Vincent Larivière, Stefanie Haustein & Philippe Mongeon, The Oligopoly of Academic
Publishers in the Digital Era, 10(6) PLOS ONE e0127502 1, 3–4 (2015).
See Weingart, supra note 45, at 97, 100 (pointing out that publications are “generally not
substitutable” and that large publishers have “an oligopoly status”).
See Karaganis, supra note 62, at 20 (on price discrimination through secrecy).
While publishers do not pay for articles, scientists do, however, receive (modest)
royalties for monographs.
See Guibault, supra note 74, at 138 (“pay thrice”); Reto M. Hilty, Five Lessons about
Copyright in the Information Society: Reaction of the Scientific Community to OverProtection and What Policy Makers Should Learn, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 103,
123 (2005) (saying that the situation is “grotesque”).
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struggling financially. Students (are unable to) pay ever-increasing fees,
libraries are under-resourced, departments are closed for lack of (financial)
sustainability, scientists are subject to precarious working conditions. 105 The
legitimate question is, what is the “value added” by scholarly publishers that
would justify their high prices? In the analogue era, publishers still created a
physical product, whose “manufacture” required technical skill, machinery,
and material resources. Logistics were subsequently necessarily to ship
products to different parts of the world. Much of this falls away in the digital
era. 106 A report about Elsevier produced by Deutsche Bank in 2005
accordingly finds the multiple-pay model “bizarre,” journals’ working capital
requirements to be “minimal, ” and the professional publishers, overall, to
“add little value to the research process.” 107
One might perhaps argue that the commercial scholarly publishers are
gatekeepers making sure that only quality science gets published, through the
peer review processes they organize. However, not only can peer review be
organized as effectively by institutionalized science itself, it is also
fundamentally problematic for science to outsource one of its central
responsibilities, quality control, to private industry. Sydney Brenner, Nobel
Laureate in Physiology or Medicine in 2002, pertinently voices this concern
as follows:
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106

107

Regarding scholarly libraries, see, e.g., Hilty, supra note 103, at 122 (pointing out that
many states have reduced expenses for public research); Karaganis, supra note 62, at 8
(noting that there have been journal database price increases of 5 to 7 percent per year in
the 1990s and 2000s in the U.S., but that library budgets remained static); Weingart,
supra note 45, at 97 (referring to the financial crisis of libraries). To address the “serial
crisis,” libraries frequently shift resources from the acquisition of books to journal
subscriptions, leading to a crisis in the university presses: Karaganis, supra note 62, at
8–9.
For similar observations, see Hilty, supra note 103, at 120–21 (despite desktop
publishing, “surprisingly, journal prices never really sink”); Alexander Peukert & Marcus
Sonnenberg, Copyright and Changing Systems of Scientific Communication, in THE
FUTURE OF SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING: OPEN ACCESS AND THE ECONOMICS OF
DIGITISATION, supra note 45, at 199, 218 (“a traditional knowledge broker is, in
principle, no longer necessary”); Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1461 (with
desktop publishing, “the value added by such intermediaries has reached diminishing
returns”).
See Samuel J. Klein, “Turning the Supertanker: Deutsche Bank on Elsevier’s Excess,”
KFG
Notes
(Aug. 5,
2019),
https://notes.knowledgefutures.org/pub/supertanker/release/3 (last visited on Mar. 31,
2022) (quoting from the report); MORRISON, supra note 74, at 143–45 (arguing that high
costs are caused by paid editorial staff, “offices in the world’s highest-priced real estate
markets,” and marketing by large international sales teams); Richard Van Noorden, The
True Cost of Science Publishing, 495 NATURE 426, 426 (Mar. 28, 2013) (“Cheap openaccess journals raise questions about the value publishers add for their money.”).
Publishers, however, argue that digital publishing has not reduced costs as most costs, so
they maintain, are incurred before publication and because higher-level technical experts
are now needed: see Julie L. Kimbrough & Laura N. Gasaway, Publication of
Government-Funded Research, Open Access, and the Public Interest, 18 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 267, 294–95 (2016) (referring to the publishing industry’s perspective).
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I don’t believe in peer review because I think it’s very distorted and … simply a
regression to the mean. I think peer review is hindering science. In fact, I think it has become
a completely corrupt system. It’s corrupt in many ways, in that scientists and academics have
handed over to the editors of these journals the ability to make judgment on science and
scientists. … [I]t puts the judgment in the hands of people who really have no reason to
exercise judgment at all. And that’s all been done in the aid of commerce, because they are
now giant organisations making money out of it. 108

There are also many other reasons to question the suitability of
(traditional) peer review. Hence, it does not prevent “bad” quality from being
published. Simultaneously, it often impedes innovative science. In many
ways, as shown below, peer review also conflicts with scientific freedom. 109
The science evaluation systems governments have directed be put in place
in conjunction with the peer review by journals form the basis of the
economic power of the commercial scholarly publishers. Evaluation systems
require publication in journals with high JIFs. These, in turn, are the product
of the way peer review processes are organized by journals (employing, e.g.,
artificially high rejection rates). JIFs again determine the prices of journals.
Authors are willing to hand over their copyright in order to be published in
journals with a high JIF, most of these (still) paywalled, thus conferring
economic power on the publishers, leading to restrictions on dissemination,
access, and use. 110 The logic of this system is that, for scientists to advance
108

109

110

Elizabeth Dzeng, How Academia and Publishing are Destroying Scientific Innovation:
A Conversation with Sydney Brenner, KING’S REV. (Feb. 24, 2014).
See John Bohannon, Who’s Afraid of Peer Review?, 342 SCIENCE 60 (Oct. 4, 2013)
(bogus paper accepted by credible OA journals); Bill Cope & Mary Kalantzis, Signs of
Epistemic Disruption: Transformations in the Knowledge System of the Academic
Journal, in THE FUTURE OF THE ACADEMIC JOURNAL 13, 34–39 (Bill Cope & Angus
Phillips eds., 2009) (identifying these deficits: review process hidden to readers, data
excluded, reviewers need not defend their views, subversive network effects); Martin P.
Eve, Before the Law: Open Access, Quality Control and the Future of Peer Review, in
DEBATING OPEN ACCESS (Nigel Vincent & Chris Wickham eds., 2013) 68, 75 (lack of
accountability of reviewers, review process remains invisible); Horace Freeland Judson,
The Problems of Peer Review, in THE GREAT BETRAYAL: FRAUD IN SCIENCE 282–85
(2004) (no proof that peer review yields better quality, conservative, a bureaucratic
formality, lack of accountability); Bruno S. Frey, Publishing as Prostitution? Choosing
between One’s Own Ideas and Academic Success, 116 PUB. CHOICE 205 (2003) (pleasing
reviewers); IMAD A. MOOSA, PUBLISH OR PERISH: PERCEIVED BENEFITS VERSUS
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 120 (2018) (submission outcome “governed by a
stochastic process”); Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of
Science and Journals, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 178, 179–80 (2006) (slow, expensive,
inconsistent, biased, prone to abuse); U.K. Parliament, HC, Sci. & Tech. Comm., 8th
Rep., Peer Review in Scientific Publications ¶¶ 30–58 (July 28, 2011),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmsctech/856/85602.htm
(stifles innovation, biased, expensive, burdensome, lack of evidence of efficacy)
[hereinafter U.K. Parliament, Peer Review in Scientific Publications]; JOANNA
WILLIAMS, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN AN AGE OF CONFORMITY: CONFRONTING THE FEAR
OF KNOWLEDGE 57 (2017) (pleasing reviewers). On (improving) quality control in
scholarly publishing, see also infra Section II.C., notes 231–36 and accompanying text.
In this sense, see also Bellia & Moscon, supra note 57, at 11–13 (arguing that peer review
practices plus scientific research evaluation systems lead to authors transferring their
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in their careers, they must limit the impact of their writing by “ensuring it
goes unread” by other scientists and the larger public. 111 JIFs do not make
sense from a scientific point of view. The merit of any one article is
determined by the number of citations of other articles – and then merely over
two years. 112 JIFs may further be artificially boosted by the acceptance of “a
few blockbuster articles.” 113 Moreover, research demonstrates the absence of
any “compelling evidence” that journal rank can reliably predict scientific
impact or quality.114 The U.K. parliamentary Science and Technology
Committee has accordingly expressed “concerns about the use of journal
Impact Factor as a proxy measure for the quality of an individual article.”115
Overall, JIFs indicate the commercial rather than the scientific value of a
journal. 116
It has cynically been remarked that today’s universities are only
marginally concerned with gaining knowledge, that they have become
“fundraising institutions” and “publication factories” managed by
“CEOs.” 117 “Quantity” plays a crucial role in the present scheme of things.
Success in evaluations and competitions for projects and funding depends on
quantity of publications as well. 2.5 million articles are published yearly
worldwide in 25.000 peer reviewed research journals. 118 Global scientific
output grows by 8 to 9 percent every year, and doubles every nine years. 119
Much of this, even if good, is, however, again quickly forgotten. 120 Too much
research is being published; most of this “must be reckoned as merely a
distant background noise.” 121 The “publish or perish” ideology (“PoP”), at
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rights and publishers acquiring bargaining power).
Sarah Kendzior, Academic Paywalls Mean Publish and Perish, Al Jazeera, Opinion
(Oct. 2, 2012), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/10/2/academic-paywallsmean-publish-and-perish.
Cope & Kalantzis, supra note 108, at 43 (emphasizing that “good” research takes longer
to be appreciated).
Id. at 43–44.
Björn Brembs, Katherine Button & Marcus Munafò, Deep Impact: Unintended
Consequences of Journal Rank, 7 FRONT. HUM. NEUROSCI. ArtID: 291, 1, 4-5 (2013).
U.K. Parliament, Peer Review in Scientific Publications, supra note 108, ¶ 177.
Weingart, supra note 45, at 98.
Mathias Binswanger, Excellence by Nonsense: The Competition for Publications in
Modern Science, in OPENING SCIENCE: THE EVOLVING GUIDE ON HOW THE INTERNET IS
CHANGING RESEARCH, COLLABORATION AND SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, supra note 40, at
49, 53.
See Françoise Salager-Meyer, Open Access: The Next Model for Research
Dissemination?, in GLOBAL ACADEMIC PUBLISHING: POLICIES, PERSPECTIVES AND
PEDAGOGIES 184, 187 (Mary J. Curry & Theresa Lillis eds., 2018) (mentioning these
figures).
According to Lutz Bornmann & Rüdiger Mutz, Growth Rates of Modern Science: A
Bibliometric Analysis Based on the Number of Publications and Cited References, 66 J.
ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2215, 2218 (2015).
See Pietro Della Briotta Parolo et al., Attention Decay in Science, 9 J. INFORMETRICS
734–45 (2015) (clearly demonstrating how the exponential growth in the number of
papers published nowadays leads to papers being forgotten ever more quickly).
Derek J. De Solla, Price Networks of Scientific Papers: The Pattern of Bibliographic
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the heart of “modern” science,” quintessentially has to do with quantity. As
has been observed, “[t]he only people who benefit from the intense pressure
to publish are those in the publishing industry.” 122 For science, the
consequences are devastating. “PoP” tends to “crowd out” intrinsically
motivated curiosity, 123 which is required for groundbreaking discovery. 124
There is clear proof that “PoP” negatively affects accepted tasks of scholars
related to expanding and sharing their knowledge, writing referee reports or
newspaper articles, or translating research outcomes for the public or
policymakers. 125 “PoP” creates a demand for peer review that cannot be met
anymore. 126 It leads to a decline in scientific quality. In certain fields of
science, up to 90 percent of papers detail research that is irreproducible. 127
More than 80 percent of published papers, in some fields, do not receive a
single citation. 128 Research misconduct in the form of plagiarism or the
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References Indicates the Nature of the Scientific Research Front, 149 SCIENCE 510, 515
(July 30, 1965). Generally on the astronomical growth in publications and its detrimental
effects on science, see, e.g., Philip G. Altbach & Hans De Wit, Too Much Academic
(Sept. 7,
2018),
Research
Is
Being
Published,
U. WORLD NEWS
https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20180905095203579; Charlotte
Price Persson & Johanne Uhrenholt Kusnitzoff, Crisis in Basic Research: Scientists
(Feb. 13,
2017),
Publish
Too
Much,
SCIENCENORDIC
https://sciencenordic.com/academia-basic-research-basic-research-crisis/crisis-in-basicPACCHIONI,
THE
research-scientists-publish-too-much/1442296;
GIANFRANCO
OVERPRODUCTION OF TRUTH: PASSION, COMPETITION, AND INTEGRITY IN MODERN
SCIENCE (2018).
David Colquhoun, Publish-or-Perish: Peer Review and the Corruption of Science, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2011/sep/05/publishperish-peer-review-science.
See Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Ranking Games, 39 EVAL. REV. 102, 111 (2015)
(making this statement generally for output-related incentives, also in science).
EGER & SCHEUFEN, supra note 80, at 113.
Hendrik P. Van Dalen & Kène Henkens, Intended and Unintended Consequences of a
Publish-or-Perish Culture: A Worldwide Survey, 63 J. AM. SOC’Y INFORM. SCI. & TECH.
1282–93, 1290–92 (2012).
See Susan Wright, Measurements and Distortions: A Review of the British System of
Research Assessment 19 (Working Papers on University Reform, Working Paper 9, June
2008) (“rising demand for peer review,” universities “instructing their academics to focus
only on producing articles … and to refuse requests to act as a peer reviewer
themselves”).
See MOOSA, supra note 108, at 71–73 (citing various studies demonstrating the
irreproducibility problem). Generally see DAVID RANDALL & CHRISTOPHER WELSER,
THE IRREPRODUCIBILITY CRISIS OF MODERN SCIENCE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
THE ROAD TO REFORM (National Association of Scholars, Apr. 2018) (highlighting the
irreproducibility problem in science).
Lokman I. Meho, The Rise and Rise of Citation Analysis, 20 PHYSICS WORLD 32, 32
(2007) (“some 90% of papers that have been published in academic journals are never
cited”); Sierra Williams, “Are 90% of Academic Papers Really Never Cited? Reviewing
the Literature on Academic Citations,” LSE Impact Blog (Apr. 23, 2014),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2014/04/23/academic-papers-citationrates-remler (last visited on Mar. 31, 2022) (querying the 90% figure, yet finding that
about 82% of articles in the humanities are never cited).
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fabrication or manipulation of findings is widespread. 129 “PoP” entails an
enormous waste of public resources. The publishing of superfluous texts
consumes time that academics could have spent on thorough research or
teaching. The libraries of research institutions pay for redundant publications.
Researchers spend unnecessary energy first having to separate “good” from
“bad” papers. 130 Funding bids – also the many unsuccessful ones – cost
money. 131 “PoP” exhausts scientists mentally. 132 With their emphasis on
quantity, research evaluation systems create “perverse incentives” and “are a
key driver of predatory journals.” 133 If “PoP” leads to a thriving scholarly
publishing industry as the one side of the coin, then the other is the corruption
of science. 134
A transition to OA publishing, by itself, will not bring about a change of
the current state of affairs. While the commercial publishers for a long time
lobbied against “open access,” claiming, for example, that it was not
compatible with peer review, they have meanwhile accepted it as an
inevitable reality. 135 However, not only will the transition still take
considerable time to be accomplished. 136 Only 28 percent of all scholarly
publications are currently “open access.” 137 The commercial publishers are
retaining their economic power in various ways. On average, APCs of nearly
a thousand US dollar are payable. Journals with high JIFs will charge
particularly high APCs. 138 Furthermore, while texts in their basic format will
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See MOOSA, supra note 108, Ch. 4 (furnishing proof of research misconduct as a
consequences of “PoP”).
See, e.g., Lydia Heller, “Forschung und Corona: Publikationsflut beeinflusst
wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt,” Deutschlandfunk Kultur (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/forschung-und-corona-publikationsflutbeeinflusst-100.html (reporting on how “bad” Covid-19 studies obstructed Covid
research).
See, e.g., Simon Baker, Failed Horizon 2020 bids “cost European universities £6
HIGH.
EDUC.
(Mar. 21,
2019),
billion,”
TIMES
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/failed-horizon-2020-bids-cost-europeanuniversities-ps6-billion (demonstrating how much money can be lost in connection with
failed funding bids).
See, e.g., Sally Weale, Higher Education Staff Suffer “Epidemic” of Poor Mental Health,
GUARDIAN
(May 23,
2019),
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/may/23/higher-education-staff-sufferepidemic-of-poor-mental-health (“excessive workloads,” “repeated research … audits,”
“culture of workplace surveillance”).
COMBATTING PREDATORY ACADEMIC JOURNALS, supra note 71, at 65, 67.
See Altbach & De Wit, supra note 120 (“drastic cutbacks are needed”); Colquhoun, supra
note 121 (a maximum of two original papers per year).
See MORRISON, supra note 74, at 130–31 (“Anti-OA lobbying”); Weingart, supra
note 45, at 100 (reporting that Elsevier accepts that the subscription model will
disappear).
See Bellia & Moscon, supra note 57, at 15 (pointing out that OA has so far “not
disrupted” the subscription model).
Heather Piwowar et al., The State of OA: A Large-Scale Analysis of the Prevalence and
Impact of Open Access Articles, PEERJ 6:e4375, DOI: 10.7717/peerj.4375 1, 1 (2018).
COMBATTING PREDATORY ACADEMIC JOURNALS, supra note 71, at 62. See also JOSE L.
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be(come) freely accessible, publishers will in future provide a gamut of
indispensable ancillary services (access to data, TDM, evaluation of
reference lists, etc.) that must be paid for. 139 They may also require that
readers be limited to non-commercial reuses only, reserving commercial
reuse to themselves. 140 Consequently, the copyright monopoly (will)
remain(s) with the commercial scholarly publishers.
I.

II. THE REBSPA IN THE ICESCR: GIVING RISE TO A “RIGHT TO
RESEARCH”?

A. The REBSPA in Article 15(1)(b): Freedom of, Benefiting from,
and Protection against Science
Article 15 of the ICESCR provides as follows:
1.

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve
the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation,
the development and the diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived
from the encouragement and development of international contacts and cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields. 141

139
140

141

PEREZ VELAZQUEZ, THE RISE OF THE SCIENTIST-BUREAUCRAT: SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR
RESEARCHERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 60–63 (2019) (explaining that the rising costs of
publishing in journals are disturbing, unfairly affecting many scientists); Peter Weingart,
Trust, Quality Assurance and Open Access: Predatory Journals and the Future of the
Scholarly Publication System, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING: OPEN
ACCESS AND THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITISATION, supra note 45, at 265, 268 (“the costs for
the public purse [are] incalculable”).
See Weingart, supra note 45, at 100 (referring to Elsevier’s strategy in this regard).
See Michael W. Carroll, Why Full Open Access Matters, 9 PLOS BIOLOGY e1001210 1,
2–3 (2011) (describing this as “pseudo open access”).
ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 15. In lieu of an extensive list of literature on the REBSPA
in the context of Article 15 here, reference is made to the 27 sources mentioned in Klaus
D. Beiter, Terence Karran & Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Yearning to Belong: Finding a
“Home” for the Right to Academic Freedom in the U.N. Human Rights Covenants, 11
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107, 166–67 n. 216 (2016) and Beiter, supra note 18,
at 234–35 n. 7, in addition to all the other sources mentioned in this and those two articles.
While a provision largely according with Article 15 may be found in the Inter-American
human rights system, no comparable provisions exist in the European or African human
rights systems: Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), Art. 14,
Nov. 17, 1988, OAS Treaty Series No. 69 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999). However,
some scholars opine that most obligations under the right to science also arise under the
right to freedom of expression and information: see, e.g., Christoph B. Graber, Copyright
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The REBSPA in Article 15(1)(b) must be understood in the context of the
other provisions of Article 15. Notably, the role of the protection of creators’
moral and material interests (Article 15(1)(c)) in its relation to the advance
of science (Article 15(1)(b)) needs to be construed correctly. 142 The
realization of all human rights, but in particular economic, social, and cultural
rights, depends on scientific progress and access to technologies. Good
examples are the rights to food or health. 143 Article 15(1)(b) and these rights
must be read to mutually reinforce each other.
While still some fifteen years ago, the normative content of the REBSPA
had not been the subject of “more official” deliberation, the Venice Statement
on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications
(REBSPA) of 2009, an expert document prepared under the auspices of
UNESCO, made an initial attempt to shed light on the right. The REBSPA
was considered to cover three claims: first, the creation of an enabling and
participatory environment for the conservation, development, and diffusion
of science and technology, this implying inter alia academic and scientific
freedom, second, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications (e.g., access to technology or non-discriminatory participation in
the improvement of well-being that scientific advance entails), and, third,
protection from abuse and adverse effects of science and its applications.144
One may take note here of the clear links to Article 15(2) and (3). Arranged
somewhat differently is the 2012 rendering by Farida Shaheed, former U.N.
Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights. According to her, the
REBSPA encompasses:
(a) access to the benefits of science by everyone, without discrimination;
(b) opportunities for all to contribute to the scientific enterprise and freedom
indispensable for scientific research; (c) participation of individuals and
communities in decision-making; and (d) an enabling environment fostering the

and Access: A Human Rights Perspective, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: THE END
71, 81 (Christoph B. Graber et al. eds., 2005). This right is
protected by most human rights systems: see, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (as amend. and supp.); American Convention on
Human Rights, Art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into
force July 18, 1978); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 9,
June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986)
[hereinafter Banjul Charter].
In this regard, see infra Section II.B.
See ICESCR, supra note 15, Arts. 11, 12 (“the right of everyone to an adequate standard
of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,” “the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,”
respectively).
Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its
Applications, in UNESCO, The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its
Applications: Venice, Italy, 16–17 July 2009, 13, ¶ 13(a)–(c) (UNESCO, 2009)
[hereinafter Venice Statement].
OF COLLECTING SOCIETIES?
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conservation, development and diffusion of science and technology. 145

Again, the links to Article 15(2) and (3) are clearly borne out. The latest
official statement on the REBSPA is the CESCR’s General Comment No. 25.
It emphasizes that “benefits” mean (1) technology, (2) scientific knowledge
as such (and this would cover scholarly publications), interestingly,
(3) capability for critical citizenship, and, significantly, (4) enhanced wellbeing, peace, and human rights through science. 146 The exact normative
implications of the REBSPA may be expressed in the “AAQAF” format. 147
States must make the necessary infrastructure for the conservation,
development, and diffusion of science available. “Diffusion,” it may be
observed, includes “the dissemination of scientific knowledge … within the
scientific community and in society at large, including through publishing
research findings.” 148 Instruments for diffusion are, for instance, the internet
and libraries. Barriers to access the benefits of science must be removed
(copyright could thus restrict access). Access must be ensured without
discrimination, for example, on the ground of economic situation (high APCs
can be a problem). Quality is to be assured, for instance, of the science
process (e.g., ethics) or technological applications. Also scholarly
publications must be of a high quality (rigor, replicability, honesty).
Acceptability means that science needs to be explained and its applications
tailored to suit different socio-cultural contexts and the particularities of
various beneficiaries. This surely covers diversified forms of science
communication so as also to reach the larger public. Finally, freedom of
science must be guaranteed (freedom to disseminate, access, use).
Another framework that facilitates deciphering the normative content of
the REBSPA is the tripartite typology in terms of which all human rights
entail obligations to “respect,” “protect,” and “fulfil.” 149 The negative
obligation to respect, requiring states to refrain from action that infringes a
right, would thus – to relate this to the copyright and science discussion –
expect states not to interfere with the freedom to undertake scientific
research, to disseminate its results, or to co-operate with scientists nationally
and internationally. 150 The positive obligation to protect requires states to put
in place measures protecting citizens against other private actors. This must
be held to cover the protection of scientists against the excesses of the
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Farida Shaheed, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights: The
Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/20/26, ¶ 25 (May 14, 2012).
As condensed from General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶¶ 6–8.
Id. ¶¶ 16–20. The rendering of the elements and the examples here freely interpret the
original text.
Shaheed, supra note 144, ¶ 48.
See General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶¶ 41–50 (applying this framework to the
REBSPA).
See Audrey R. Chapman, Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits
of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, 8 J. HUM. RTS. 1, 18 (2009) (mentioning these
three instances).
WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

PIJIP RESEARCH PAPER NO. 79

30

scholarly publishing industry. Finally, the positive obligation to fulfil,
primarily progressive in nature, 151 requires states to actively promote the
advancement of science and invest resources toward this end. 152 Hence,
General Comment No. 25 posits that states parties are obliged to ensure
“equitable and open access to scientific literature.” 153
One should, moreover, take note of the way in which the ICESCR
envisages comprehensive norm clarification to occur under the Covenant.
The U.N. Specialized Agencies, of which UNESCO is one, in dialogue with
the CESCR, are assigned a role in taking “international measures likely to
contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the … Covenant,”
inter alia in the form of “the conclusion of conventions [and] the adoption of
recommendations.” 154 UNESCO is the U.N. Specialized Agency with a clear
mandate in the field of science. 155 Many of its legal instruments must, in this
sense, be seen to concretize the content of certain Covenant provisions.
Hence, the REBSPA must also be understood in the light of UNESCO’s
Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching
Personnel of 1997, its Recommendation on Science and Scientific
Researchers of 2017, and its Recommendation on Open Science of 2021. 156
In fact, the 2017 Recommendation, in its preamble, refers to Article 27(1) of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which is the
“predecessor” provision of Article 15(1)(b) of the Covenant. 157
As all other rights of the ICESCR, states parties must, in accordance with
Article 2(1) of the Covenant, realize the REBSPA “progressively … to the
maximum of [their] available resources.” 158 Steps toward realization must,
however, be taken without delay and they must be “deliberate, concrete and
targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in
the Covenant.” 159 Retrogressive measures, as also instances of noncompliance with a minimum core obligation, constitute prima facie
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On the general (often progressive) nature of state obligations under the ICESCR, see infra
notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
For a list of generic positive duties under the obligation to fulfil the REBSPA, see
Chapman, supra note 149, at 25.
General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 49.
ICESCR, supra note 15, Arts. 22–23.
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
Art. I, Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 (entered into force Nov. 4, 1946).
UNESCO General Conference, Recommendation concerning the Status of HigherEducation Teaching Personnel, Doc. 29 C/Res 11 (Nov. 11, 1997) [hereinafter UNESCO
Recommendation (1997)]; UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20; UNESCO
Recommendation (2021), supra note 25.
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, Preamble, Recital 2; U.N.G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 27(1) (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 2(1).
U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3, The Nature of
States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2(1) of the ICESCR), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23
(Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter General Comment No. 3].
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violations. These but also other limitations of rights would have to be strictly
justified under Article 2(1) in the light of resource constraints or the general
limitation clause of Article 4, as appropriate. 160
B. Relationship to Article 15(1)(c): Protecting the Moral and
Material Interests of Authors
The delicate nature of Article 15(1)(c) has been alluded to. One may ask,
is the realization of the REBSPA and the more open science envisaged by it
not frustrated by the requirement that creators’ moral and material interests
be protected as a human right? Does Article 15(1)(c) not mandate a human
rights guarantee of copyright as an institution? This would be highly
problematic. As General Comment No. 25 observes, copyright frequently
“limit[s] the sharing of information on scientific research.” Further, “the
excessive price of some scientific publications is an obstacle for low-income
researchers.” 161
The nature of Article 15(1)(c) needs to be properly understood. The
CESCR has in another General Comment of 2006, specifically on this
provision, clarified the purpose of Article 15(1)(c). 162 The Committee
underlines that Article 15(1)(c) safeguards “the personal link between
authors and their creations … as well as their basic material interests.” 163 This
has two important implications. On the one hand, creators’ moral rights
(rights of attribution, integrity, and so on) deserve protection. 164 Moreover,
protection is accorded to the actual creator only – and not to any subsequent
assignee of rights, for example, a publisher. On the other hand, material
interests are protected to the extent only that this is necessary to enjoy an
adequate standard of living, as contemplated in Article 11(1) of the
Covenant. 165 This covers modest, certainly not extravagant benefits.
Interestingly, Aurora Plomer has analyzed the travaux préparatoires of the
second paragraph of Article XIII of the socialist-inspired American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted on 2 May 1948, six
months before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 166 This
160
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ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 4. For a description of the general nature of state obligations
under the ICESCR, see, e.g., General Comment No. 3, supra note 158; MATTHEW
CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT Ch. 3 (1995); MANISULI SSENYONJO,
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Ch. 2 (2009).
General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 61.
U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 17: The Right of
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting
from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author
(Art. 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR) U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter
General Comment No. 17].
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 15. ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 11 (the right of everyone to an adequate standard
of living).
O.A.S. Res. XXX, American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, Art. XIII, ¶ 2
(May 2, 1948). See Aurora Plomer, IP Rights and Human Rights: What History Tells Us
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provision, protecting the “moral and material interests” of authors,
substantially influenced the similarly worded Article 27(2) of the UDHR, in
turn the “predecessor” of Article 15(1)(c) of the Covenant. 167 Plomer
explains that the meaning of the “moral and material interests” of authors in
Article XIII was “spiritual/mental” and “material/physical” well-being.168
Hence, in the American Declaration, “moral” was not a renvoi to the moral
rights of Berne. Yet, holding – as the CESCR does – Article 15(1)(c) to (also)
cover moral rights in the sense of Berne is a good approach. However,
Plomer’s analysis makes one thing very clear: “Material” interests cannot be
equated with the copyright holder’s (comprehensive) economic rights.
Another important point to highlight is that Article 15(1)(c) protects human
persons only. The Committee correctly emphasizes that legal persons do not
enjoy protection under this provision. This per se excludes any publishing
company as right-holder. Only humans can create and be “authors” as
understood by Article 15(1)(c). 169
While human rights are fundamental, inalienable, and universal
entitlements, IP rights are temporary in nature, can be revoked, licensed, or
assigned. 170 IP regimes protect investments, the right in Article 15(1)(c)
inherent dignity. 171 Protection under Article 15(1)(c) is granted if, and only
to the extent that, this is required by “human dignity.” Claims not founded on
this grundnorm of human rights do not enjoy protection. It is, therefore,
important “not to equate” IP rights with the human right in
Article 15(1)(c). 172 Article 15(1)(c) does not afford an institutional guarantee
of copyright, also not in the sphere of science.
A question that arises is whether it is not possible to rely on the right to
property in support of strong IP, including copyright, protection. Gladly, one
might argue in this respect, the right to property is not found in the U.N.
Human Rights Covenants. 173 It is, however, protected in various regional
human rights treaties. 174 Under the European Convention on Human Rights,
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and Why It Matters, in THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE: THEN AND NOW 54, 60–74 (Helle
Porsdam & Sebastian Porsdam Mann eds., 2022) (The author analyses the drafting of
Article 27(2) of the UDHR in the light of the travaux préparatoires on the second
paragraph of Article XIII of the American Declaration. The travaux préparatoires of the
American Declaration were published in 2017 only.).
UDHR, supra note 156, Art. 27(2).
Plomer, supra note 165, at 74.
General Comment No. 17, supra note 161, ¶ 7.
Id. ¶¶ 1, 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
ICCPR, supra note 140; ICESCR, supra note 15. The right to property is, however,
protected by Article 17 of the (non-binding) UDHR: UDHR, supra note 156, Art. 17.
See Protocol to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (entered into force
May 18, 1954) [hereinafter Protocol No. 1]; American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 140, Art. 21; Banjul Charter, supra note 140, Art. 14.
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claims based on the right to property may even be raised by legal persons. 175
Yet, three points must always be kept in mind: first, again, the concept of
“human dignity” should serve as the deciding criterion in assessing whether
human rights – as opposed to, potentially, any other “lower tier” form of legal
– protection is warranted in a certain type of situation. Hence, “how much”
property is needed to confirm human dignity? 176 Second, even where human
rights protection is warranted, property in human rights law is always socially
constricted by others’ human rights (such as the REBSPA). 177 Third, the
“fundamental” rights of a company can never be “human” rights, and can,
therefore, not rank on a par with actual human rights (e.g., the REBSPA).178
Accordingly, while the concept of property could include IP, also copyright,
claims, corporate IP claims can hardly ever be a matter of human rights. Even
where they are, they will struggle to compete with human rights such as the
REBSPA.
C. A More Human Rights-Oriented Approach: The Concept of
“Adequacy for Science” as the Basis for Another Science
The approach of assessing the need for copyright reform in the field of
scholarly publishing on the basis of the REBSPA is novel in itself. The
analysis here “goes further,” however, by taking the REBSPA “much more
seriously.” By this I mean the following. In this author’s view, current
interpretations of the REBSPA reveal certain flaws and gaps. On the one
hand, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, the Covenant’s central implementation
provision, stipulating that states parties must “take steps,” invest “maximum
resources,” and use “all appropriate means” to fully realize Covenant rights,
seems to be understood as implying that states parties must comprehensively
regulate all aspects of science. On the other hand, the understanding of
science is somehow instrumental, results-based. Science is to solve many
problems. Simultaneously, the tone remains neutral and one misses a much
clearer stance on the increasing corporatization of science, especially in
universities. The reference is to (mere) “balance” between IP law and the
interests of science. Overall, in this conception, science that solves
“practical” problems and leads to economic growth is seen, it seems, to
175
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See Protocol No. 1, supra note 173, Art. 1(1) (“Every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.”) (emphasis added).
As a leading constitutional property scholar has stated, “property rights must reflect …
the fundamental choices we have made in favour of living in a democracy characterised
by dignity”: André J. Van der Walt, The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights, 1
J.L. PROP. & SOC’Y 15, 101–02 (2014–2015).
Arguing from a philosophico-juridical perspective that property (and IP) rights,
generally, (must) fulfil a social function, see Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of
Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP law,
in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 153 (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie ed., 2013).
One should agree, “there are policy reasons, as well as reasons of principle, that stand
against recognition of corporate human rights”: Anat Scolnicov, Lifelike and Lifeless in
Law: Do Corporations Have Human Rights? 25 (U. Cambridge Fac. Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13/2013, May 2013).
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satisfy the public interest in science. As highlighted earlier, such a
performatist vision of the role of science ultimately lies at the basis of the
success of the scholarly publishing industry and the abuse of copyright in
science. The REBSPA needs to be realized in a way that better respects the
dignity of both scientists and citizens. It is necessary to recalibrate its
interpretation, and, on that basis, to assess the need for the reform of
copyright in the field of science. The term “adequacy for science” has been
coined to guide the recalibration process.
The term “adequacy for science” as used here is modelled on the German
law concept of “Wissenschaftsadäquanz,” which has a related meaning.
There it is often used as a yardstick to assess whether governance
arrangements in institutions of science are constitutional, in the sense that
they ensure that decisions on science which are collective in nature respect
freedom of science and will thus be “adequate for science.” 179 The concept,
it is submitted, could be used in a much broader sense:
[I]n order to properly implement the REBSPA – to properly realise the human
dignity on which that right is founded – the focus, rather than on the individual,
society or the economy, should be on science itself. What is good, or “adequate,”
for science will also realise the human dignity of the REBSPA. Structures,
arrangements and decisions in the field of science must, therefore, be such as will
be “in the best interest of science and scholarship.” There must be respect for the
intrinsic requirements of science and the central role that scientists themselves
should play in organising science. All this necessarily implies an effective
protection of scientific and academic freedom. 180

Structures, arrangements, and decisions will be “in the best interest of
science and scholarship” if they facilitate the discovery of “the truth.”181
Respect for the intrinsic requirements of science means respect for the
autonomous character of science, the role of intuition, anarchy, inefficiencies,
delay, and risk in science. A central role should be accorded to scientists
themselves in organizing science, as they, by reason of their training and
experience, understand the needs of science “best” (institutional autonomy,
self-governance, collegiality). Naturally, scientists must (be fully enabled to)
remain masters of the scientific endeavor itself (individual autonomy,
adequate working conditions, voluntary co-operation). Against this
description, it will be clear that, in international law parlance, recourse to the
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See, e.g., Hamburgisches Hochschulgesetz [Hamburg Higher Education Law], Decision
of July 20, 2010, BVerfG [Fed. Const. Ct., F.R.G.], BVerfGE 127, 87, ¶ 91 (in casu, the
legitimacy of assigning collegial powers to the executive level was at issue).
Beiter, supra note 18, at 286.
This is commonly accepted as the rationale for academic/scientific freedom. See, e.g.,
Ronald Dworkin, We Need a New Interpretation of Academic Freedom, in THE FUTURE
OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 181, 185–89 (Louis Menand ed., 1996) (discovery of the truth
and promotion of ethical individualism as rationales); ERIC BARENDT, ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 53–63 (2010) (discovery and nonsuppression of the truth, and intellectual independence); Beiter et al., supra note 140, at
128–32 (discovery and non-suppression of the truth, and ethical individualism, as
functions of human dignity).
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“adequacy” concept must be understood as an attempt to interpret the
REBSPA “in the light of its object and purpose.” 182
The “adequacy” concept allows one to deduce the parameters of “another
science.” The article in the Israel Law Review had made an initial attempt to
do so. It is not necessary to repeat this here. 183 Nevertheless, some crucial
points made there may be singled out in the list below, others, and their
relevance to the copyright and science discussion, will become clearer in the
further discussion under this heading. Salient elements of “another science”
are the following:
Scientific freedom: Scientific freedom is the best guarantor of scientific
progress in the interest of society at large. There is only one “complete”
definition of “academic freedom” in international (soft-)law, namely that laid
down in UNESCO’s Recommendation of 1997. This also protects freedom
of research and the right to disseminate and publish results. 184
Mertonian norms: The resources, infrastructures, and findings of science
should be “commonly owned” beyond national borders. In the digital context,
scientific knowledge (publications, research data, software) should be openly
disseminated, at no cost to the researcher and at little cost to the research
system, and be freely accessible and reusable without impediment for
everyone. Science must be universally valid. It must be disinterested rather
than guided by political, economic, or social usefulness or expedience. If
science is to maximally benefit the human rights of all in society, a prominent
role must be accorded to pure science. Science must be original and skeptical.
Components of freedom in different types of entities: Protection levels
for individual freedom of enquiry should be the highest in universities. They
should be medium-to-high in non-university research institutes. They may be
lower in commercial enterprises undertaking research. Institutional
autonomy, self-governance, and collegiality are crucial safeguards of
freedom of enquiry in universities. They also play a role in non-university
research institutes. 185
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
See Beiter, supra note 18, Section 6 (enumerating 22 recommendations), and generally
the article’s points and all the sources it mentions.
See UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 27 (the definition
encompassing freedom of teaching, freedom of academics to express freely their opinion
about the institution/system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship,
freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies, the right to fulfil
functions without fear of repression by the state or any other source, a democratic
atmosphere). Trying to locate the “home” of the right to academic freedom in the U.N.
Human Rights Covenants, see Beiter et al., supra note 140. For a list of General
Comments, declarations, and statements by states and civil society at the international
level, adopted over the years, on academic freedom, see id. at 120 nn. 36–38, 185–86.
On the difference between scientific and academic freedom, see id. at 163–75.
“Institutional autonomy” protects the institution as such against political or any other
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The role of the scientific fraternity: As regards the organization of
science, legislation should exhibit a procedural character and a modest level
of regulatory “density.” The ultimate competence for regulation and decisionmaking in the field of science should be assigned to the scientific fraternity
itself.
The role of government: Insofar as pure science is concerned, the role of
the government is to focus on financing, providing, encouraging, mediating,
and supervising. State supervision of universities should reflect a hands-off
approach, with the state intervening only where academia is clearly in
dereliction of its duties.
The neoliberal approach to science: Deliberate public underfunding, an
excessive focus on competitive funding, the financial dependence of
institutions on contract research for government or industry, top-down forms
of governance in universities and research institutions, and the conscious
adoption of an audit culture for and in these, are not “adequate for science.”
The human rights approach to science: Pure science should be subsidized
at high levels. The emphasis on competitive funding should be reduced.
Appropriate organizational dynamics in this context include autonomy for
scientists, a positive organizational culture, low hierarchies, reduced
emphasis on evaluation, and trust. It is necessary to move beyond the public
accountability excesses in the science sector of the past three or four decades.
Patents: University inventions should immediately be publicly available
through automatic affordable licenses to a patent, or better still, a genuine
public domain strategy.
Equipped with the “adequacy” standard, one may have a look at current
interpretations of the REBSPA again, to identify if they do, or do not, address
aspects important for science and whether they address relevant aspects
adequately. The emphasis will be on issues of quality, performativity, and
“publish or perish”; NPM and science evaluations; peer review; and
intellectual property protection, all these issues that impact on scholarly
communication, publishing, and copyright.
There is a danger of accentuating the positive, “provision-of-benefits”
dimension of the REBSPA at the expense of its negative, freedom dimension
– of failing to appreciate that only a robust protection of scientific freedom

form of outside interference. “Self-governance” ensures that scientists from within the
institution administer it. Governance is thus not to be accorded to managerial experts not
originally from within the institution, not scientists themselves, and not actively engaged
in science. Managerial or executive governance is not “adequate for science.”
“Collegiality” is directed against hierarchy in research units and institutions to prevent
accumulation of power not “adequate for science.” “Self-governance” and “collegiality”
may not always be in the interest of efficiency, but efficiency is an irrelevant criterion in
science. For an analysis of the meaning and rationale of these three elements, as protected
in UNESCO’s 1997 Recommendation, see Beiter et al., supra note 140, at 124–27, 132–
38.
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makes possible benefits in the first place. 186 Admittedly, this may be
oversimplifying things, but one way of reading recent interpretations of the
REBSPA is this: One the one side, there are a multitude of noble (and this is
not meant disparagingly) goals that have been formulated for science, on the
other, there is a citizenry that may claim the benefits flowing from reaching
those goals. Squeezed in between the two is a poor caste of scientists
singularly made to bear the heavy responsibility of satisfying the enormous
demands on science. To secure the delivery of benefits, their freedom may
have to be “streamlined.” A former member of the CESCR had thus warned
that Article 15(1)(b) might be a sleeping dog that one should let lie – at least,
however, that one should interpret the provision very cautiously. 187 It is
interesting to note that a publication of 1986, which may perhaps be seen as
the first interpretation of the REBSPA by notable international law scholars,
articulating what would be required within a rule of law paradigm for science
to yield advance, essentially focuses on the rights of scientists. 188 While
recent interpretations of the REBSPA do include scientists’ freedom claims,
they do so in a rather brief, enumerative, and formalistic manner. 189
They do not elaborate on what the research process is, what it
constitutionally requires to function properly. Research thus becomes
something one can simply have recourse to whenever problems need to be
solved. However, it is rather unrealistic to hold out research as being able to
deliver benefits, appreciating that the research process itself largely evades
control. Indeed, there must, of course, be ample scope for applied research.
However, scientific breakthrough is seldom planned. Presupposing a general
science preparedness, this may happen or not happen. What pure science
could be useful for emerges only much later. Arjun Appadurai therefore
refers to “the strangeness” of research:
[I]ts fundamental mystery is that it purports to be a systematic means for
discovering the not-yet-known. How can you have a systematic means for getting
to what you do not know? For example, what you do not know might be so
profoundly unsystematic that systematically getting to it is logically impossible. 190

186

Further explaining this, see Beiter, supra note 18, at 250–61 and the sources mentioned
there. See also the critical discussion of UNESCO’s Recommendation on Science and
Scientific Researchers of 2017: id. at 269–85 and sources mentioned there.
187
Eibe Riedel, Sleeping Beauty or Let Sleeping Dogs Lie? The Right of Everyone to Enjoy
the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications (REBSPA), in COEXISTENCE,
COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY: LIBER AMICORUM RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, Vol. 1, 503
(Holger P. Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2012).
188
ZIMAN, SIEGHART & HUMPHREY, supra note 6. Sieghart and Humphrey were
international human rights scholars.
189
For example, as for General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, see specifically id. ¶¶ 13,
43, 46, 50. Frequently, references occur in a context simultaneously emphasizing the
point that scientific freedom is not absolute and may be limited: see id. ¶¶ 13, 22, 50, 52,
55, 57, 86.
190
Arjun Appadurai, The Right to Research, 4 GLOB., SOC’IES & EDUC. 167, 169
(2006).
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The question accordingly is, what should recent interpretations of the
REBSPA have emphasized about the research process? A brief look at the
literature is instructive. First, science is not really susceptible to being
planned. The German Constitutional Court, in its seminal Hochschul-Urteil
of 1973, refers to this as “the autonomous character of science.” 191 Science
follows its own laws, thus requiring large-scale state abstention from
interference in the field of science. Robert Merton similarly points out that
concrete planning “is inappropriate to most research.” He then proposes an
attractive definition of scientific freedom:
The crowning reward of [mere] general planning is that it will preserve a freedom
of inquiry, a freedom of opportunity … the opportunity to profit from the
unexpected. It is in the best interests of science and of democratic society … that
serendipity be held in high esteem. 192

Max Perutz, who received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1962, held that
creativity in science, as in the arts, cannot be organised. It arises spontaneously from
individual talent. Well-run laboratories can foster it, but hierarchical organisation,
inflexible, bureaucratic rules, and mountains of futile paperwork can kill it.
Discoveries cannot be planned; they pop up, like Puck, in unexpected corners. 193

Second, already Max Weber reminded us in his brilliant essay on Science
as a Vocation of 1919 that science must remain “disinterested,” that is, not
guided by notions of value or worth, or usefulness or purpose. These are not
scientific, but political considerations. 194 “Disinterestedness” subsequently
became one of the central structural elements of science in Merton’s analysis
as well. 195 “Disinterestedness” preserves the scientist’s curiosity, offers
protection against any disruption of the natural course of science, prevents
fraud, and ensures that science serves all and not only certain interests or
groups in society. To quote the German Constitutional Court again, “science
free from considerations of social utility and political expedience serves state
and society in the final analysis best.” 196
Third, science is slow. Science “indulges in a typical delay and deferral
of decisions about what the world is like, how to describe and explain it, and
191

Hochschul-Urteil [University Judgment], Judgment of May 29, 1973, BVerfG [Fed.
Const. Ct., F.R.G.], BVerfGE 35, 79, ¶ 128 (“Eigengesetzlichkeit”).
192
ROBERT K. MERTON & ELINOR BARBER, THE TRAVELS AND ADVENTURES OF
SERENDIPITY: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGICAL SEMANTICS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
191–92 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193
MAX PERUTZ, I WISH I’D MADE YOU ANGRY EARLIER: ESSAYS ON SCIENCE,
SCIENTISTS AND HUMANITY ix (2003).

Max Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf, in GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE ZUR
WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE 541–45, 550 (1922) (irrelevance of “Sinn” or
“Zweck”).
194

195

Merton, supra note 3, at 275–77.

196

Hamburgisches Hochschulgesetz Case, supra note 178, ¶ 90 (own

trans).
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what to do about it.” It requires “preservation of a place of quiet, stillness,
and unhastened reflection.” 197 A problem of science today is its ideal of “the
fast, cumulative advance of disciplinary knowledge along with a correlative
disregard for any question that would slow this advance down.” 198 The way
out of time pressure is “to challenge the corporate clock by thinking through
… the expectation of productivity.” 199 As the Slow Science Manifesto
formulated by German academics demands, “[s]cience needs time to think.
Science needs time to read, and time to fail. … We cannot continuously tell
you what our science means; what it will be good for; because we simply
don’t know yet.” 200
Fourth, scientists know better than politicians or anybody else in society
where new knowledge is likely to lie. They “have been shown to have a
remarkably good ability either to predict future social problems long before
other citizens do or to provide the necessary knowledge base for such
predictions.” 201 Albert Einstein thus ascribed to scientists a special intuition:
For scientists, “[t]here is only the way of intuition, which is helped by a
feeling for the order lying behind the appearance and this Einfuehlung is
developed by experience.” 202 Michael Polanyi held that scientists possess a
certain “tacit knowledge,” that is, a hidden knowledge of problems, the best
way to pursue them, and the as yet indeterminate implications of any
discovery. 203
Fifth – and very important in the copyright debate: “communism,” as
Merton underlines, is an integral element of the scientific ethos:
The substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are
assigned to the community. They constitute a common heritage in which the equity
of the individual producer is severely limited. … Property rights in science are
whittled down to a bare minimum by the rationale of the scientific ethic. The
scientist’s claim to “his” intellectual “property” is limited to that of recognition and
esteem … The institutional conception of science as part of the public domain is
linked with the imperative for communication of findings. Secrecy is the antithesis
of this norm; full and open communication its enactment. The pressure for diffusion
of results is reenforced by the institutional goal of advancing the boundaries of
knowledge and by the incentive of recognition which is, of course, contingent upon
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Dick Pels, Unhastening Science: Autonomy and Reflexivity in the Social Theory of
Knowledge 2 (2003).
198
Isabelle Stengers, Another Science Is Possible: A Manifesto for Slow Science 98
(trans. Stephen Muecke, 2018).
199
Maggie Berg & Barbara K. Seeber, The Slow Professor: Challenging the Culture of
Speed in the Academy 55 (2016).
200
“The Slow Science Manifesto” (2010), http://slow-science.org.
201
Arne Jarrick, The Scientific Mission and the Freedom of Research, in
Transformations in Research, Higher Education and the Academic Market: The Breakdown
of Scientific Thought 53–67, 63 (Sharon Rider, Ylva Hasselberg & Alexandra Waluszewski
eds., 2013).
202
Albert Einstein, Prologue, in Max Planck, Where Is Science Going? 10 (1932).
203
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension 6 (2009) (“the tacit power of scientific …
genius”).
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publication. 204

Sixth, Lea Shaver emphasizes:
The value of science then, is not purely instrumental. … [T]here is also a value
inherent in the process itself. … Engaging in scientific discovery … helps us to
realize and express parts of our shared humanity, which has value from the
perspective of individual development and the shared life of the community. 205

The above makes it quite clear that science under the REBSPA should
always be understood in a qualitative rather than quantitative sense. One
implication hereof would be that researchers should only publish if they have
“something” to report, after sufficient reflection. Other researchers should
spend much more time on validating existing research before proceeding to
publish new texts. This may, therefore, be seen as calling for a renunciation
of the “publish or perish” ideology in science, as it negatively affects the
quality of scholarly work and undermines scholarly integrity. The existing
REBSPA texts are weak on the point. What also becomes clear is that the
current practices of the scholarly publishing industry significantly contribute
to eroding the notion of quality as presented here.
It is interesting to note that, during the drafting of Article 27(1) of the
UDHR, a formulation proposed by the Soviet Union, in terms of which
science should serve “democracy,” “peace,” and “co-operation,” was rejected
by the Western group. Eleanor Roosevelt thus stated that the U.S. delegation
“would under no circumstances agree that science should be placed at the
service of politics.” Even René Cassin for France argued that “that principle
might be invoked to justify the harnessing of science to political ends.” 206 As
never before, one can today witness how science has been made to serve an
ideology, that of market fundamentalism, “useful” research, and economic
growth. 207 With the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S. in 1980, and
similar legislation in other parts of the world, requiring universities to
marketize their research through IP rights, technology developed in
universities, and often even basic research, have not only become a source of
revenue for institutions, but now also obstruct societal access to research
results. 208 Privatization impedes further scientific progress. 209 Important but
204
205

206

207

208

209

Merton, supra note 3, at 273–74.

Lea Shaver, The Right to Science: Ensuring that Everyone Benefits from Scientific and
Technological Progress, 2015 EUR. J. HUM. RTS. 411, 416 (2015).
For a discussion of the travaux préparatoires of Article 27(1), see William A. Schabas,
Looking Back: How the Founders Considered Science and Progress in their Relation to
Human Rights, 2015 EUR. J. HUM. RTS. 504, 511–12 (2015).
Discussing corporatism in science, see Beiter, supra note 18, at 261–60 and the sources
mentioned there.
See Richard R. Nelson, The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons, 33 RES.
POL’Y 455, 462 (2004) (mentioning these two “key developments”: “at least some of the
results of basic research can be patented,” “universities … take out patents on their
research results”).
Id. at 455 (“the scientific commons is becoming privatized … bad news for both the
future progress of science, and for technological progress”).
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non-profitable areas of research are neglected. 210 Contract research for
governments and private industry is another source of income, but obviously
limits curiosity-driven and objective research. Basic research can never be
shown to have impact. The “impact agenda” of funding councils pushes
science away from disinterested toward (economically) “useful” research. 211
The research topics which funding bodies are prepared to support “can be
quite explicitly linked to the political agenda of the government of the
day.” 212 Competitive funding leads researchers to choose “fashionable”
topics. 213 Research, in many ways, has become a matter of short-term task
teams “sent out” to solve practical problems. 214 While public research
funding thus essentially promotes private industry interests, governments
make their citizens believe that all this is in the public interest. 215
Academic science should be based on the CUDOS norms of science as
expounded by Merton in 1942: communism, universalism, disinterestedness,
and organized skepticism. 216 These norms legitimately play a reduced role in
the sphere of applied science in non-university research institutes that follow
a set research agenda. They play no role in research conducted by private
business. Industrial science follows the PLACE pattern: Science here is
proprietary (not communalist), local (not universal), authoritarian (not
disinterested), commissioned (not original), and expert (rather than
skeptical). However, the problem is that the PLACE pattern has come to
govern academic science, which should essentially be pure science, too. 217
NPM in science – as it were, a modern form of the bureaucratization in
science that already Max Weber had warned against 218 – can only be
understood against the background of the commercialization of science just
described. Bureaucracy (hierarchy, evaluation) may lead to increased
productivity, but also reduced creativity in science. 219 Modern science is
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212
213

214
215

216
217
218

219

Chapman, supra note 149, at 8–9.
See Philip Moriarty, Science as a Public Good, in A MANIFESTO FOR THE PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY 56, 64 (John Holmwood ed., 2011) (“Scientific curiosity, disinterestedness
and creativity are all adversely affected by the … impact agenda.”).
Williams, supra note 108, at 57.
Li Bennich-Björkman, Has Academic Freedom Survived? An Interview Study of the
Conditions for Researchers in an Era of Paradigmatic Change, 61 HIGH. EDUC. Q. 334,
351 (2007).
Jarrick, supra note 200, at 58.
See Moriarty, supra note 210, at 58 (“business-led … focus on … applied research … is
‘sold’ as being entirely in the public interest”).
Merton, supra note 3, at 270–78.
ZIMAN, supra note 4, at 78–79.
See Weber, supra note 193, at 526–27 (explaining that, while bureaucracy has clear
benefits in any capitalistic enterprise, its application in universities destroys the spirit
(“Geist”) of scholarship).
See You-Na Lee & John P. Walsh, Rethinking Science as a Vocation: One Hundred Years
of Bureaucratization of Academic Science, SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 8–9, 19–20,
https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211026020 (online 22 June 2021) (referring to some
evidence in this regard).
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about productivity, that is, quantifiably “more” outcome. Researchers receive
good evaluations if they can demonstrate that they have secured many
patents, if they have published many articles, desirably in journals with high
JIFs. This is associated with progress in science. However, as Michael Power
demonstrates in his fascinating book about the “audit society” and its “rituals
of verification,” quantifiable indicators have two major effects. First, the
counting of outcome becomes ritualized. Compliance with such targets is
falsely equated with quality compliance. 220 Met benchmarks on numbers of
articles, for example, say nothing about the quality of the articles, whether
they have actually been read (as opposed to merely cited), and whether, in
one way or another, they have been valuable to the common good. Even
article-level metrics –usage data, citations, altmetrics (metrics based on the
social web) – do not measure quality, but something else, namely attention,
self-promotion, easy access, ostensible quality based on publication in a
journal with a high JIF. 221 Second, the endeavor to achieve targets
“colonizes” the minds of scientists and their research units toward focusing
on just that.222 In universities, for instance, important duties, such as
expanding one’s scholarship through reading, providing wider policy advice,
or promoting cultural life on campus, are not attended to anymore because
success “cannot be counted.” 223 Many academics thus invest enormous time
resources into strategically submitting articles to certain rather than other
journals and trying to please peer reviewers. Contributing to science through
one’s writings becomes a secondary concern. In science, quantifiable
performance indicators are therefore of particular concern. This has also to
do with the “value incongruence” between the tasks of scientists, which are
highly uncertain, and the indicators in the form of “inappropriately”
deterministic performance standards. 224 There are many unintended
consequences flowing from audits in research. Researchers may decide to
work within mainstream areas to secure publication in certain prestigious
journals. There may be a rush to mediocrity as researchers may choose to do
less risky research that will guarantee timely results for publication. 225 Audits
220
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222
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224
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See MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 95–97 (1999)
(“decoupling”).
See Martin Fenner, Altmetrics and Other Novel Measures for Scientific Impact, in
OPENING SCIENCE: THE EVOLVING GUIDE ON HOW THE INTERNET IS CHANGING
RESEARCH, COLLABORATION AND SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, supra note 40, at 179, 184,
188 (acknowledging this for altmetrics, but also generally asking whether “numbers [can]
reflect the impact of research, across disciplines and over time”).
POWER, supra note 219, at 97–98 (“colonisation”).
See Geoffrey Boulton & Colin Lucas, What Are Universities For? ¶ 62 (League of Eur.
Res. Universities, Sept. 2008) (“To define the university enterprise by these specific
outputs, and to fund it only through metrics that measure them, is to misunderstand the
nature of the enterprise and its potential to deliver social benefit.”).
Michael Power, Research Evaluation in the Audit Society, in WISSENSCHAFT UNTER
BEOBACHTUNG: EFFEKTE UND DEFEKTE VON EVALUATIONEN 15, 15 (Hildegard Matthies
& Dagmar Simon eds., 2008).
Lisa Lucas, Evaluating Academic Research: Ambivalence, Anxiety and Audit in the Risk
University, in DEATH OF THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY? UNCERTAIN FUTURES FOR HIGHER
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create mere “images of control.” In reality, they prevent the very goals they
were put in place for from being attained. 226 The “role” of the scholarly
publishing industry in all this is that it capitalizes on NPM in science.
In his analysis of UNESCO’s 2017 Science Recommendation, this writer
had criticized that document’s admiration for performance metrics and the
“quantitative tick-box appeal” of its prescribed formula for assessing
researcher performance. 227 The 2021 Recommendation on Open Science
fares better as it emphasizes that there should be “an increased focus on the
quality of research outputs rather than quantity.” 228 Even so, the
Recommendation remains a prisoner of neoliberalism. Why the prosaic
emphasis on evaluation in the first place? As Liz Morrish and Helen Sauntson
point out, the notion of the “underperforming professor” is a paradox.
Promotion to professorship rewards talent, reputation, and diligence. That is
the very purpose of the procedure. 229 The fact that a small percentage of
professors may yet not perform well subsequently is an inefficiency one must
accept in the larger interest of an academic system that preserves trust.
Evaluations overall should play a reduced role in science. The emphasis must
be on input rather than output control. The proper selection and socialization
of researchers makes repeated evaluations unnecessary. 230 In lieu of
performance appraisals, there should rather be “a constructive dialogue”
between research institution and scientist on how the former might better
facilitate the latter’s work. 231
Quality control in science is important. Nevertheless, it is for the
scientific fraternity to decide which forms of quality control it considers
“adequate for science.” However, UNESCO’s 2017 Science
Recommendation paternalistically requires states to impose a peer review
requirement. 232 The deficits of peer review have been dealt with above. 233

226

227

228
229

230

231
232

233

EDUCATION IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 213, 216 (Susan Wright & Chris Shore eds.,
2017). See also POWER, supra note 219, at 100 (“Scientists are changing research
habits”).
Id. at 121. See also Weingart, supra note 45, at 266–67 (NPM in science leads to the
competition for “countable products,” not a competition for “new ideas and innovative
thinking”; it “threaten[s] the fragile fabric of trust and quality control”).
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 34(a), (c); Beiter, supra note 18, at
283–84.
UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, ¶ 20(c).
Liz Morrish & Helen Sauntson, Performance Management and the Stifling of Academic
Freedom and Knowledge Production, 29 J. HIST. SOC. 42, 54–55 (2016).
See Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Academic Rankings between the “Republic of
Science” and “New Public Management,” in THE ECONOMICS OF ECONOMISTS:
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING, INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 77
(Alessandro Lanteri & Jack Vromen eds., 2014) (thus the essential message of the
authors).
Beiter, supra note 18, at 290.
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶¶ 1(a)(1), 2(c), 26, 34(c). See Beiter,
supra note 18, at 275–76 (criticizing this).
See supra Section I.C., notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
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Peer review in its traditional form is a dubious way of ensuring quality. A
reliable alternative would, for example, be editorial review, 234 which often
entails a dialogical process between editor and author. Philip Kitcher
correctly holds that
when it is claimed that inquiry must be free, what seems to be intended is that moral,
political, and religious judgments should not enter into two important contexts of decision:
the formulation of projects for scientific inquiry and the appraisal of evidence for
conclusions. 235

“Disinterestedness” thus implies that allowing peer reviewers to reach
final decisions on “impact” violates scientific freedom. As it were, impact
criteria should play a very limited role prior to publication. If a “light” initial
review reveals the scientific soundness of a text, it principally qualifies for
publication. 236 It is then for the larger science (and other) communities to
validate the findings and for published research to acquire real-world impact
(or not). The identity of reviewers must always be revealed and their reviews
be made openly available. This will very likely prevent unsubstantiated,
unfair, or biased commentary. It would also reflect a recognition of their
review role. As for OA journals, it is after publication that reviewers may,
potentially, be assigned a “more thorough” review role that is visible online.
Ideally, a dialogue between author and reviewer, visible to the world, should
ensue. Moreover, in the absence of clear errors, it must always, at whatever
stage of the process, be left to the discretion of authors whether or not to
amend their texts. Otherwise one would be dealing with a case of censorship.
Post-publication and peer-to-peer review are interesting options. 237 A final
point here, it is crucial that the organization of quality control in science
revert to science institutions. As a central function of science, quality control
can obviously not be outsourced to commercial publishers whose primary
objective has little to do with promoting science.
Current interpretations of the REBSPA frequently call for a “balance”
between IP and open scholarly communication, that is, for tensions between
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See MORRISON, supra note 74, at 15–16 (“peer review is not the only means of ensuring
academic quality control … [an] alternative is editorial review”).
PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY 3 (2001).
The role of referees in the process can only be that of offering suggestions. Final decisions
must always rest with the editors: Frey, supra note 108, at 218.
See Binfield, supra note 69, at 159–61 (“novelty in the peer review model,” referring to
various new models followed in practice); Cope & Kalantzis, supra note 108, at 52
(“Open peer review … may well produce greater accountability on the part of editors and
referees.”); EGER & SCHEUFEN, supra note 80, at 116 (“increasing importance of OA
mega-journals with open post-publication reviews”); Eve, supra note 108, at 69 (“a kind
of post-publication, or peer-to-peer, review”); FREELAND JUDSON, supra note 108, at 285
(hoping for “a time when open commentary and review replace the current, flawed
system of closed pre-publication peer review”); Smith, supra note 108, at 181 (“a very
quick and light form of peer review – and then let the broader world critique the paper”);
U.K. Parliament, Peer Review in Scientific Publications, supra note 108, at ¶¶ 78, 211
(remarking that open peer review is “attractive,” post-publication review “powerful”).
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these two to be resolved. 238 However, as Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin
observe, the documents do not indicate how tensions are to be negotiated in
practice. 239 Strictly, it is also not correct to say that IP rights and the REBSPA
need to be balanced. At most, the rights in Article 15(1)(b) and (c) can be
balanced on a par. IP rights generically, as indicated, do not constitute a
“constitutional” category, or, at any rate, only a very weak one. UNESCO’s
2021 Recommendation on Open Science appears to envisage quite a strong
position for IP rights. It envisages OA publishing platforms and OA
repositories, access free of charge, and possibilities to reuse, repurpose,
adapt, and distribute works. 240 However, OA does not cover free publishing
for researchers or sincerely require reorientation toward affordable
publishing. Paragraph 8 states that access to knowledge should be as open “as
possible.” Access restrictions are justifiable on the basis of “the protection of
intellectual property rights.” 241 Paragraph 16(c) requires a “diversity of
business models” to be recognized in the sphere of publishing. 242 It seems
that the traditionally powerful role of publishers is intended to remain intact.
Hence, the question of the huge financial burden of open access for authors
and research institutions remains. Especially from the perspective of the
global South, matters are not resolved. Taking academic freedom seriously
(freedom cannot have a price tag) and considering that scarce public
resources should not be diverted to enhance private profits, the REBSPA
should be held to protect free publishing for researchers, and also to mandate
reorientation toward affordable scholarly publishing to protect funders and
institutions.
D. Constructing a “Right to Research” under the REBSPA
To what extent then does the REBSPA cover a derivative “right to
research”? An analysis of the relevant normative and quasi-normative
documents and authoritative secondary literature reveals that this can perhaps
be stated to have a conceptually more negative and a conceptually more
positive side. 243 The former is the right or freedom of scientists, but also
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See, e.g., Venice Statement, supra note 143, ¶ 10 (“tensions” to be resolved); UNESCO
Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 18(d) (“balancing”); General Comment
No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 62 (“balance”).
LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 238 (2011).
UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, ¶ 7, opening section, (a).
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 16(c). Similarly, Paragraph 20(j) does not require a move toward non-commercial
publishing models, but only their “support”: id. ¶ 20(j).
The “right to research” as constructed here is inferred from existing official texts and
“merely” articulates a general aspect of the REBSPA. In that sense, even if inspired by a
novel interpretation of the latter right, it is a derivative – as opposed to a free-standing –
“new” human right. Applying this distinction in postulating “new” human rights, see also
Brandon L. Garrett, Laurence R. Helfer & Jayne C. Huckerby, Closing International
Law’s Innocence Gap, 95 S. CAL. L. REV. 311 (2021); Danwood M. Chirwa, Access to
Water as a New Right in International, Regional and Comparative Constitutional Law,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY,
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others, “to do research.” The latter is the right of citizens to enjoy “access to
the benefits of research.” This does not mean that the former does not also
entail significant positive duties of the state and the latter also important
negative duties. What it means is that the former ultimately seeks to ensure
that scientists can work in circumstances where they are not prevented from
doing their work. This dimension applies most broadly in the realm of the
creation of “pure” scientific knowledge in universities and similar
institutions. The latter signifies that securing access to the benefits of science
can only be achieved in a proactive way. Properly construed, this dimension
requires states, first, to promote a conducive environment for “pure” science
and the dissemination of its benefits, and, second, to more actively drive
knowledge production, innovation, and technology in the R&D sector at the
periphery of universities, in non-university research institutes focusing on
applied science, and in the business sector, and the subsequent transfer and
diffusion of the benefits.
What are the normative claims encompassed by the negative right “to do
research” of specific relevance in the copyright and science context? 244
1. Status: Scientists should enjoy a standing which facilitates their
research. 245 On the one hand, there needs to be an adequate general
appreciation for the research profession. 246 On the other, scientists should
enjoy a research environment 247 characterized by security of employment, 248
good salaries, 249 workload that is not excessive, 250 and proper social security
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RHETORIC 55 (Andreas von Arnauld, Kerstin Von der Decken & Mart Susi eds., 2020);
Pierre Thielbörger, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed and Something
Blue: Lessons to Be Learned from the Oldest of the “New” Rights – the Human Right to
Water, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION,
NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra, at 71.
See also the list of rights suggested by ZIMAN ET AL., supra note 6, adding rights such as
the right to education, freedom of movement, or freedom of association and assembly.
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, Preamble, Recital 10 (“status
commensurate with … role”); UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20,
Preamble, Recital 7 (“a fair status”).
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶¶ 1(e), 24(a) (“level of
appreciation,” “public recognition”).
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 7 (working conditions “as will
best promote effective … research”); UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20,
¶¶ 1(e), 11, 24(a) (addressing rights, working conditions, material assistance, moral
support).
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶¶ 45–46 (tenure or “its functional
equivalent” as a safeguard of academic freedom); UNESCO Recommendation (2017),
supra note 20, ¶ 27(c) (“address precariousness due to … limited-duration contracts”),
¶ 27(d) (career stability for early researchers).
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 57 (“remuneration such that they
can devote themselves satisfactorily to their duties”), ¶ 58(a) (“reflect the importance to
society”), ¶ 58(c) (“a reasonable standard of living”).
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 62 (“fair and equitable … to carry
out effectively … research”).
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benefits. 251 Scientific freedom is simultaneously a precondition for respect
for status and facilitates scientific freedom.
2. Research autonomy: UNESCO’s 2017 Recommendation obliges
states to institute procedures ensuring to scientists “the degree of autonomy
appropriate to their task.” Creativity of scientists is to be promoted “on the
basis of utmost respect for the autonomy and freedom of research.” 252
Researchers should enjoy the right “to work in a spirit of intellectual freedom
to pursue, expound and defend the scientific truth as they see it.” 253 The
earlier 1997 Recommendation, focusing on researchers in universities,
guarantees, as part of academic freedom, the right to carry out research
work. 254 Scientists may choose their research topics and methods, draw
conclusions from their findings, question accepted wisdom, and create new
knowledge. 255 There is also a right of “conscientious objection,” permitting
withdrawal from participation in research that conflicts with one’s moral or
religious world views. 256 Research autonomy is most extensive in the sphere
of pure science, but may be lower in the sphere of applied science. 257 It is
subject to duties of honesty, ethics, and quality. 258
3. Guarantees of scientific/academic freedom: Institutional autonomy,
self-governance, and collegiality need to be safeguarded. Low hierarchies are
to prevail in the science sector. In universities, line management must be
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UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 63 (“protected by social security
measures”).
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 16(a)(i).
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶¶ 27, 29 (“the right … to …
freedom in carrying out research,” “a right to carry out research work”).
General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 13 (articulating scientists’ rights to define the
aims and methods); Bonn Declaration on Freedom of Scientific Research, Minist. Conf.
on the Eur. Res. Area, Bonn (Oct. 20, 2020) (define research questions, choose and
develop theories, gather empirical material, employ sound research methods, question
accepted wisdom, bring forward new ideas – see under “A shared definition of freedom
of scientific research”) [hereinafter Bonn Declaration]; Jogchum Vrielink, Paul
Lemmens, Stephan Parmentier & the LERU Working Group on Human Rights,
Academic Freedom as a Fundamental Right ¶¶ 38, 39 (League of Eur. Res. Universities,
Advice Paper No. 6, Dec. 2010) (choose topic, method, mode of analysis, to draw
conclusions from findings, subject to limitations); Terence Karran, Academic Freedom
in Europe: Time for a Magna Charta?, 22 HIGH. EDUC. POL’Y 163, 173–74 (2009)
(choose subject areas and research methods, subject to limitations).
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 16(a)(iii); General Comment
No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 13; Vrielink et al., supra note 254, ¶ 40; Karran, supra note 254,
at 174.
To this effect, see Vrielink et al., supra note 254, ¶ 39.
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶¶ 33, 34(c) (honesty), ¶ 34(d)
(ethics), ¶ 35 (“highest possible standards”); UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra
note 20, ¶ 12 (researchers of “integrity and intellectual maturity, combining high,
intellectual qualities and respect for ethical principles”); General Comment No. 25, supra
note 19, ¶ 18 (quality), ¶ 19 (ethics); Vrielink et al., supra note 254, ¶ 39 (ethics); Karran,
supra note 254, at 173 (ethics), 174 (honesty).
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abolished. The scientific fraternity enjoys rights of self-regulation. 259 It
should inter alia adopt a publishing code protecting the interests of scientists
and science. 260
4. Absence of censorship: Scientists should be able to carry out research
“without fear of repression by the state or any other source,” 261 there should
be “freedom from institutional censorship,” 262 and their intellectual freedom
should include “protection […] from undue influences on their independent
judgement.” 263
5. “Ownership” of research: Researchers in universities and nonuniversity research institutes may claim “ownership” to their scientific works.
It is usually said that, contrary to the orthodox rule that copyright vests in the
employer, copyright here belongs to the employee. 264 While the bearer of
“ownership” here indeed is the researcher, as will be seen later, 265 this need
not take the form of economic rights under copyright law to comply with the
REBSPA. Authors’ rights in need of protection are, for example, the right to
publish (listed separately below), or the moral rights of Berne, that is, the
right to claim authorship of a work (right of attribution) and that “to object to
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, [a] work, which would be prejudicial to [one’s] honor or
reputation” (right of integrity). 266 In cases of externally funded research, the
allocation of “ownership” claims will have to be clarified contractually. 267
6. Access to information: Scientists have a right of access to
information. 268 This covers access to information of public interest held by
public authorities and also official documents. 269 It includes access to
scholarly literature. Access to the internet must be realized, and up-to-date

259
260

261
262
263

264

265
266
267
268

269

See supra Section II.C. (Components of freedom …, The role of the scientific fraternity).
See Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Free Access to Research Findings and Its Limitations,
in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF SCIENCE UNDER ASSAULT: POLITICS, MARKETS, SCIENCE AND
THE LAW 109, 122 (Helga Nowotny et al. eds., 2005) (making such a suggestion in the
light of the right to self-regulation).
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 27.
Id.
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 16(a)(i); General Comment No. 25,
supra note 19, ¶ 13.
Holding that this is (or should be) the legal position, see, e.g., American Association of
University Professors, Statement on Copyright, https://www.aaup.org/report/statementcopyright; Bellia & Moscon, supra note 57, at 5–11; BARENDT, supra note 180, at 215–
19; Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to
Faculty Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 275 (2002).
See infra Section III.B., notes 399–402 and accompanying text.
Berne Convention, supra note 29, Art. 6bis(1).
Karran, supra note 254, at 174.
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 140, Art. 19(2) (defined as the right of “everyone” with
regard to information “of all kinds”); Venice Statement, supra note 143, ¶ 14(a)
(mentioned in the context of the REBSPA).
Vrielink et al., supra note 254, ¶¶ 41–43.
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research libraries should be ensured. 270
7. Collaboration: Scientists may collaborate with each other within and
across national borders. 271
8. Sharing information: Scientists may share information with other
scientists, policy-makers, and the public, within and across national
borders. 272
9. Freedom of speech: Researchers enjoy very high levels of freedom of
“intra-mural” academic speech (i.e., expression by researchers within their
field which is directed at the research community). Levels of protection for
“extra-mural” academic speech (i.e., expression by researchers within their
field directed at a lay audience) is not as high, yet higher than for ordinary
freedom of expression. 273
10. Right to publish: Researchers are entitled to publish their findings “in
books, journals and databases of their own choice.” 274 This also includes the
right not to publish, where a researcher no longer agrees with the content.275
Limitations imposed for instance in the case where research is externally
funded must strictly comply with Article 4 of the ICESCR. 276 Moreover,
researchers are required always to respect and acknowledge the scholarly
work of others. 277 Researchers are entitled to support that helps them to
270

271

272

273
274

275
276

277

UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶¶ 11, 22(o) (“up-to-date” libraries);
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 13(e) (literature), ¶ 27(f)
(literature), ¶ 28 (“international databases and journals, libraries and other sources of
information”); General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 16 (libraries, internet), ¶ 49
(literature); Shaheed, supra note 144, ¶ 74(c) (internet, scientific knowledge).
Venice Statement, supra note 143, ¶ 14(c); UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra
note 155, ¶ 14; UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶¶ 18(a), 31; General
Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 13 – all addressing/including the international
dimension.
Venice Statement, supra note 143, ¶ 14(c) (including the international dimension);
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 14 (the international dimension is
implicit); UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶¶ 16(a)(v), 18(d), 31 (the
latter two provisions addressing the international dimension); General Comment No. 25,
supra note 19, ¶¶ 13, 78 (the latter provision addressing the international dimension).
Vrielink et al., supra note 254, ¶¶ 48–58.
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 12; see also id. ¶ 27 (freedom in
“disseminating and publishing … results”); UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra
note 20, ¶ 38 (right to publish); General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 50 (right to
publish); Shaheed, supra note 144, ¶ 74(f) (“the right to freely publicize results”);
Vrielink et al., supra note 254, ¶ 47 (“[f]reedom to dispose of research”); Karran, supra
note 254, at 174–75 (freedom to determine “methods and avenues by which they
disseminate”).
Vrielink et al., supra note 254, ¶ 47.
ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 4; General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 50. See also
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 38(a) (restrictions must be “strictly
minimized”).
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 34(e). See also UNESCO
Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶¶ 16(a)(viii), 18(d), 38(a) (appropriate
crediting).
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publish open access. 278
11. Open communication: The principle of the “open communication” of
findings or “open scientific knowledge” underlies the pertinent UNESCO
Recommendations. The documents emphasize that this has its basis in
academic freedom and serves the purpose of validation. 279 “Openness”
regarding publications signifies that there should be facilities enabling the
scientist to communicate publications and data related thereto openly so that
other scientists can access these freely (without cost) and use them without
undue restrictions. 280 APCs should be borne by research institutions or other
funders. 281
12. Open research data: Researchers are entitled to make their research
data openly available and to support that helps them doing so. 282 This
simultaneously facilitates access by other researchers to such data. Research
data “belongs” to the researcher(s) concerned. They may decide whether or
not to release it. Where a publication relies on such data, however, the data
should be made openly available.
13. Removal of restrictions: States are obliged to remove barriers to
publishing, sharing, and archiving scientific outputs. 283 States should
reconsider the “maximalist” IP approach and explore the benefits of a
“minimalist” approach. 284 Failure to redress the extraordinary expansion of
IP law in the sphere of publishing may violate Article 15(1)(b). 285
14. Financing and infrastructure: Academic freedom requires “stable
institutional financing.” 286 High levels of funding should be available for
pure science. The emphasis on competitive funding needs to be reduced.287
278
279

280

281

282

283
284
285

286

287

UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶¶ 27(f), 35, 36.
UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, Preamble, Recital 8 (“open
communication,” required by academic freedom, “provides the strongest guarantee of the
accuracy and objectivity of scholarship and research”); UNESCO Recommendation
(2017), supra note 20, Preamble, Recital 4(c) (“open communication,” required by
academic freedom, “provides the strongest guarantee of accuracy and objectivity of
scientific results”); UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25 (this document
developing a framework for open science, including open scientific knowledge).
See UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, ¶ 7, opening section, (a)
(identifying these elements and envisioning both gold and green OA).
On the cost or affordability issue, including from the perspective of protecting public
funds, see also supra Section II.C., notes 240–41 and accompanying and subsequent text,
and infra Section III.B., note 379 and accompanying text.
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶¶ 27(f), 35, 36; UNESCO
Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, ¶ 7, opening section, (b).
General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 49.
Shaheed, supra note 144, ¶ 74(o).
See Christine Mitchell, Epilogue: Tensions in the Right to Science Then and Now, in THE
RIGHT TO SCIENCE: THEN AND NOW, supra note 165, at 286, 295 (who could be
interpreted in this way).
Bonn Declaration, supra note 254 (see under “The role of governments to protect the
freedom of scientific research”).
See supra Section II.C. (The neoliberal vs. the human rights approach to science).
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Freedom of research depends on the necessary “infrastructure,” 288 including
in the form of good quality dissemination avenues for research. 289 Not-forprofit university publishers should be well subsidized by states. 290 States are
required to allocate maximum resources to science. 291 They must proactively
create an “enabling” environment for the enjoyment of scientific freedom. 292
15. Slow science v “publish or perish”: There should be a renewed
emphasis on “slow science” as most “adequate for science.” “Publish or
perish” as a central tool of research management impedes the discovery
process, spurs scholarly dishonesty, and results in publications of
deteriorating quality. 293
16. Peer review: The scientific fraternity (not the state or publishers) will
have to decide on the exact nature of quality control considered “adequate for
science.” Impact criteria should play a limited role prior to publication. The
identity of reviewers must be revealed and their reviews be made openly
available. Reviewers may only offer suggestions, while final decisions may
only be taken by editors. Post-publication and peer-to-peer review are very
promising options. The organization of peer review must be the responsibility
of science institutions. JIFs must be abolished. Quality control must respect
scientific freedom. 294
17. Evaluations: “Adequacy for science” implies that evaluations must
play a reduced role in science. Financial and moral over-incentivization (e.g.,
performance- or output-based funding) need to be terminated. Performance
management leads to the avoidance of risk in science, compromises scholarly
integrity, and results in excessive and inferior quality publications corrupting
science. Rather than controlling output, input – that is, the selection and
socialization of researchers – should be controlled. In lieu of performance
appraisals, “a constructive dialogue” between institution and scientist should
indicate the latter’s support needs. Moreover, publication metrics or
altmetrics may play no role in assessments. Publications may only be
assessed by reading them. 295
What are the normative claims encompassed by the positive right of
citizens to enjoy “access to the benefits of research” of specific relevance in
the copyright and science context? These would essentially be citizens’
claims of access and reuse of scholarly publications, research data, and
software. The best way to facilitate such access and use clearly is open access.

288
289

290
291
292
293
294
295

See, e.g., UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 5.
See, e.g., id. ¶ 12 (“publication and dissemination … should be encouraged and
facilitated”).
Beiter, supra note 18, at 290.
ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 2(1).
See, e.g., General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 46.
See supra Section II.C., notes 189–204 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C., notes 217–30 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C., notes 231–36 and accompanying text.
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18. (Evolving) open access for all: OA scientific knowledge may be
useful to the public for many reasons. Insofar as medical research is
concerned, the public has an interest in OA “because of their roles as funders,
advocates, research participants, and patients.” 296 NGOs and governments
require access to many types of knowledge to assist them in policy
formulation. OA to research for the R&D sector may lead to innovation and
new technology, which may broadly be stated to further the public interest. 297
OA would even likely advance science by ordinary citizens. James Boyle
holds that one should not underestimate the power of a lay audience, enjoying
free access to scholarly work, “to add richness and depth to the world of
scholarship.” The virtues of a larger-than-expected audience, serendipitous
uses, and cooperative enterprise, he argues, may entail scientific progress.
Openness to the public “ought to be a general design principle.” The success
of this vision is based on “the comparative absence” of IP rights, of course. 298
A crucial precondition to realizing the right of the public to OA scholarly
knowledge is to respect all the entitlements covered under the negative right
“to do research.” This ensures that quality knowledge is (or may be) available
for dissemination. Governments, funders, and institutions increasingly
require scientists to make scholarly publications available open access. To
the extent that publications flow from research wholly or partially funded by
public revenue, such mandates are understandable. Yet, caution needs to be
exercised. At this point in time, where subscription publishing and gold and
green forms of OA exist in the form they do, the legal situation should be
held to be as follows: Heather Morrison holds that such policies or laws are
invariably “green,” this being more inclusive, as it allows both OA publishing
and OA archiving. 299 Authors can also not be compelled to follow the golden
route against the background that many OA journals presently charge APCs
which may be beyond the financial means of authors or their institutions.
Apart from that, with many OA journals being “young,” they tend to have
lower JIFs. For as long as this measure continues to play a role, forcing
researchers to publish in a way that might compromise their career
advancement cannot be considered acceptable. 300 One may even question
296
297

298

299

300

Day, supra note 63, at 1.
See Tennant, supra note 17, at 14–15 (regarding OA benefiting R&D and having wider
societal impact).
James Boyle, Mertonianism Unbound? Imagining Free, Decentralized Access to Most
Cultural and Scientific Material, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS:
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 123, 130, 135–36, 138–39 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom
eds., 2007).
MORRISON, supra note 74, at 121. See also SCHEUFEN, supra note 92, at 154 (gold
mandate “neither fair nor reasonable”).
See EGER & SCHEUFEN, supra note 80, at 114–15 (for as long as scholars may perceive
OA journals as being of inferior quality, gold OA would conflict with academic freedom);
Peukert & Sonnenberg, supra note 105, at 226–27 (arguing that the gold mandate would,
in the light of the possible negative effects on the distribution of reputation, be
unconstitutional); Skre & Eide, supra note 63, at 452–53 (the gold mandate “limits
faculty freedom”).
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whether “green” OA archiving can be made obligatory for authors by law or
policy without further ado. Appreciating that scientific freedom includes the
right not to publish and that, in some countries, there even exists a moral right
to withdraw a publication from circulation, researchers must at least possess
an opt-out option on a case-by-case basis. Some writers have suggested that
institutions should hold a non-exclusive automatic license to noncommercially archive staff articles. 301 Also this can only be acceptable if an
author can principally opt out in individual cases. 302 Such a license may
further only be executable if an author neglects to self-archive. In any event,
an OA requirement is only compatible with scientific freedom if the right to
(self-)archive is made an inalienable entitlement vis-à-vis publishers. 303 If
this were not so, publishers’ contracts could deny archiving, thus limiting
scientists’ publication choices.
Archiving clearly benefits scientists themselves. Scientists should
demand repositories from their institutions.304 Research shows that scientists
often do not self-archive because of a lack of knowledge about OA or a
misplaced fear that OA violates copyright, bypasses peer review, or destroys
scholarly journals. 305 The approach should be to encourage self-archiving, to
provide correct information about it, and to assist scientists in the
endeavor. 306 However, policies suggesting that it be “taken into account as a
scientific and academic recruitment and promotion criterion,” as suggested
by UNESCO, 307 seem to conflict with scientific/academic freedom.
In the long term, however, scientists and the public will demand access
to scientific knowledge that is not dispersed over manifold archives, with
some documents in their published, others in a pre- or post-print format, with
different conditions of use pertaining to each document that may often also
be unclear, with some information available only after an embargo period,
and so on. Hence, in the long term, the “right to research” requires the
construction of a “true” scholarly knowledge commons. How this might be
301

302

303

304

305

306
307

Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Open Access: Reconsidering University Ownership
of Faculty Research, 85 NEB. L. REV. 351 (2006); Eric Priest, Copyright and the Harvard
Open Access Mandate, 10 NW J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377 (2012).
See Guibault, supra note 74, at 163 (“may interfere with … academic freedom”;
seemingly approving of such an opt-out); Priest, supra note 300, at 435 (considering the
opt-out “an effective built-in protection”).
See Bellia & Moscon, supra note 57, at 17 (legislation should grant authors “an
unwaivable and inalienable right to republish (make available to the public) the work in
Open Access”); SCHEUFEN, supra note 92, at 155 (“would give the author more
bargaining weight”).
See Dagmar Sitek & Roland Bertelmann, Open Access: A State of the Art, in OPENING
SCIENCE: THE EVOLVING GUIDE ON HOW THE INTERNET IS CHANGING RESEARCH,
COLLABORATION AND SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, supra note 40, at 139, 146 (making this
suggestion).
See Salager-Meyer, supra note 117, at 192–93 (citing certain sources mentioning these
aspects).
See id. at 193 (mentioning raising awareness and helping authors).
UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, ¶ 20(h).
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achieved will be further elaborated on in Section III.B. below.
E. Global Science Inclusiveness: The International Dimension of the
“Right to Research”
Increasingly, it is emphasized that science is also a global public good. 308
Accordingly, the enclosure of scientific knowledge in the countries of the
global North is a problem. Scientific results require universal validation.
Research solves problems common to different societies. By its nature,
science is “one of the most international of all activities.” 309 The
dissemination of, access to, and use of scholarly information should,
therefore, be possible and facilitated across national borders. “Global science
inclusiveness” signifies that the global South may not be excluded from
participation in what is ultimately a universal scientific enterprise. Scientific
knowledge constitutes a global commons that does not easily permit
proprietary or other exclusion.
“The right to research” has an international dimension and the rights and
duties this entails must, in constructing “the right to research,” be identified
as well. Obligations arise for states jointly and separately toward individuals,
groups, or whole populations within or beyond their borders under the
REBSPA and associated rights, giving rise to concomitant rights:
19. Right to development: The right to development as a collective right
grants to peoples the right to civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
development in accordance with their own priorities and needs, inter alia
through science, vis-à-vis the global community of states. 310 One may, for
example, observe how countries not belonging to the Western bloc have
transformed their universities in the Western image, participating in
university rankings, copying science evaluations systems, and emphasizing
publication in journals with a high JIF. 311 The consequence of this
308

309
310

311

See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 13(b), 18, or São Paulo Statement on Open Access, Joint Declaration by
the African Open Science Platform, AmeliCA, cOA-lition S, OA2020, and SciELO, São
Paulo, Brazil (May 1, 2019), https://www.coalition-s.org/wp-content/uploads/SaoPaulo-Statement-OA-01052019.pdf (recognizing this).
Chapman, supra note 149, at 27.
This definition is broadly based on U.N.G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to
Development, Art. 1(1) (Dec. 4, 1986). The normative basis for the REBSPA “as” a
binding right to development lies in Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR read with Article 1
on the right of “all peoples” (as collectives) to self-determination: ICESCR, supra
note 15, Arts. 1, 15(1)(b). Identifying aspects of the REBSPA as a group right in various
international legal instruments, see Gianpaolo M. Ruotolo, Right to Science and Open
Access to Legal Knowledge in International and European Law, in KNOWLEDGE OF THE
LAW IN THE BIG DATA AGE 101, 102–03 (Ginevra Peruginelli & Sebastiano Faro eds.,
2019).
Providing background in this regard, see, e.g., Rosemary Deem, Ka H. Mok & Lisa
Lucas, Transforming Higher Education in Whose Image? Exploring the Concept of the
“World-Class” University in Europe and Asia, 21 HIGH. EDUC. POL’Y 83 (2008);
William Y. Lo, Soft Power, University Rankings and Knowledge Production:
Distinctions Between Hegemony and Self-Determination in Higher Education, 47 COMP.
EDUC. 209 (2011).
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transformation – due in no mean measure to “soft” pressure exerted by
Western states and entities such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – is that scientists in the developing
world will refrain from publishing in local journals, because most of these
are not indexed. 312 To be published in a journal with a (high) JIF, they will
have to write about problems of the developed world, in the languages of the
developed world, and satisfy a readership in the developed world. 313 This not
only prevents local knowledge generation, but also leads to the subsequent
copyright enclosure of that knowledge in the countries of the global North.
Under the right to development, developed states could, for instance, be held
to be obliged not to obstruct the development of strong local science systems
in developing states, impede the free flow of scholarly knowledge to
developing states through restrictive copyright laws, or refuse support to a
more lenient treatment of developing states in a global copyright context
which would allow the relaxation of copyright rules in accordance with
development needs.
20. Right to international solidarity: The right to international solidarity,
a right of more recent theorization, is a collective right of nations, applicable
vis-à-vis the global community of states. The Independent (U.N.) Expert on
Human Rights and International Solidarity identifies “international cooperation” and “preventive solidarity” as two possible forms of international
solidarity directed at the fulfilment of human rights. 314 As regards the
REBSPA, the former would require concrete assistance in the field of the
international transfer of scientific knowledge (providing aid, funding,
research findings) by developed to developing states, their incentivization of
such transfer by other actors in developed states, and further their
encouragement of direct contacts between scientific communities in their and
other countries (inter alia aimed at knowledge creation and exchange). 315 The
312

313

314

315

See MORRISON, supra note 74, at 13 (noting that most journals in the developing world
are not covered).
See Sami Mahroum, “‘Publish or Perish’: The New Brain Drain in Science,” World
Economic Forum (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/publish-orperish-the-new-brain-drain-in-science (explaining this dilemma).
See Virginia Dandan, Report of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and
International Solidarity: Human Rights and International Solidarity, U.N. Doc.
A/70/316, ¶¶ 34–53, 23–33 (Aug. 12, 2015) (addressing “international co-operation” and
“preventive solidarity,” respectively). The normative basis for the right to international
solidarity as a binding right in the sphere of science lies in reading Article 2(1) of the
ICESCR (general state obligation “to take steps … through international assistance and
co-operation”) with Article 15(1)(b), (4) and further Article 1 on the collective right to
self-determination: ICESCR, supra note 15, Arts. 1, 2(1), 15(1)(b), (4).
See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 15(4) (developing “international contacts and cooperation” in the scientific field); Venice Statement, supra note 143, ¶ 24 (promoting
“international cooperation and assistance” in developing science policy); UNESCO
Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 14 (extending “direct contacts”); UNESCO
Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 18(a) (“associating scientific communities”);
WIPO, The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda,
Recomm. 26
(2007),
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latter would require states to work together in the endeavor of creating an
international enabling environment conducive to the international transfer of
scientific knowledge (e.g., urging courts and tribunals to follow REBSPAsupportive interpretative practices of copyright law or WIPO adopting a legal
instrument on L&Es inter alia facilitating access to scientific knowledge). 316
21. Extraterritorial state obligations (ETOs) to fulfil and related claims:
According to the expert Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations
of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 2011,
extraterritorial state obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil arise under all
human rights, including the REBSPA. 317 These are obligations which states
owe to individuals in other states and which, at any rate in theory, give rise
to individually enforceable legal claims. The obligation to fulfil would entail
duties to provide and facilitate, effectively replicating duties under
“international co-operation” and “preventive solidarity,” respectively, here,
however, giving rise to claims held by individuals. 318 By way of example, the
CESCR’s General Comment No. 25 may be read to suggest that states parties
to the ICESCR be held obliged to negotiate international IP agreements or
adopt domestic IP regimes in a way that fosters freedom to do research and
rights of citizens to enjoy access to scientific knowledge (thus both
components of the “right to research”) beyond their own borders. 319
Similarly, as members of WIPO or the WTO, they would have to direct their
efforts in these organizations toward facilitating the “right to research”
globally. 320
22. ETOs to protect and related claims: Without prejudice to the right of

316

317

318

319
320

development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf (driving co-operation between scientific
institutions) [hereinafter WIPO Development Agenda Recommendations]; General
Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶¶ 97–80 (allocating development aid and funding,
sharing the benefits of scientific progress).
See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 15(4) (co-operation in the scientific field);
Shaheed, supra note 144, ¶ 75(c)(i) (holding that WIPO should elaborate compilations of
good practices on measures to promote access to scientific knowledge).
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Principle 3 (2011). For a reproduction of, and commentary
to, the Maastricht Principles, see Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084 (2012). This author has previously
endeavored to exemplify how the ETOs concept might be operationalized for the right to
education to address copyright-related impediments to access to textbooks in a global
context: Klaus D. Beiter, Not the African Copyright Pirate is Perverse, But the Situation
in which (S)He Lives: Textbooks for Education, Extraterritorial Human Rights
Obligations, and Constitutionalization “From Below” in IP Law, 26 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1 (2019–2020). A similar analysis should be attempted for the REBSPA and
copyright-related impediments to the freedom to do research and the rights of citizens to
enjoy access to scientific knowledge.
On ETOs to provide, see specifically Maastricht Principles, supra note 316, Principle 33,
on ETOs to facilitate, id. Principle 29.
Based on General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 83.
Based on id.
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the host state of an agent, branch, or subsidiary of a foreign publishing
company to apply its own law, copyright-related conduct by the home/parent
company that affects the freedom to do research or the rights of citizens to
enjoy access to scientific knowledge abroad, or conduct of that nature by the
local agent, branch, or subsidiary, must be regulated and monitored by the
home state insofar as the latter may be considered to be “in a position to
regulate” the actor or its conduct concerned. Relevant conduct should be
required to comply with REBSPA standards with respect to the freedom to
do research and the rights of citizens to enjoy access to scientific
knowledge. 321 This may entail obligations for publishing firms to apply
differential pricing for their products in developing states or to offer waiver
schemes for APCs benefiting scientists in poorer countries. 322
23. ETOs, domestic state obligations, and individual rights: As regards
the REBSPA, the obligation to respect would require states to (negatively)
refrain from copyright-related conduct, including in international
organizations, which impedes the freedom to do research or rights of citizens
to enjoy access to scientific knowledge abroad. 323 ETOs to respect, and to
facilitate, when read in conjunction with domestic state obligations under the
REBSPA, imply many of the individual rights identified under the previous
heading, now, however, emphasizing the transnational context. One state
must allow and facilitate knowledge exportation, the other allow, and create
capacity for, knowledge importation. 324 The rights thus include: collaboration
by scientists across national borders, 325 sharing of information by scientists
across borders, 326 the right to “freely publicize results regardless of
frontiers,” 327 the freedom of scientists and citizens to “seek, receive, and
impart” scholarly knowledge “regardless of frontiers,” 328 or their right to
participate in open science through the unrestrained dissemination of, access

321

322

323
324

325

327
328

On ETOs to protect, see Maastricht Principles, supra note 316, Principles 23–27. See also
General Comment No. 25, supra note 19, ¶ 84 (ETOs to protect under the REBSPA).
See, e.g., Helfer & Austin, supra note 238, at 336 (suggesting that multinational
publishers should engage in differential pricing); Tennant, supra note 17, at 13 (“68.8%
of publishers offer fee waivers to low- and middle-income countries”).
On ETOs to respect, see Maastricht Principles, supra note 316, Principles 19–21.
In this vein, see also Chapman, supra note 149, at 28 (negative and positive obligations
for the country in which knowledge originates and the receiving country).
See note 270 supra.
326
See note 271 supra.
Shaheed, supra note 144, ¶ 74(f).
ICCPR, supra note 140, Art. 19(2) (defined as the right of “everyone” with regard to
information “of all kinds”). See also UNESCO Recommendation (1997), supra note 155,
¶ 14 (“access by higher education teaching personnel from other states to open
information material in public archives, libraries, research institutes and similar bodies”);
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 18(b) (“ensuring equal access to
science and the knowledge derived from it,” benefiting citizens and scientists,
“worldwide”); UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, ¶ 13(c) (“equal access
to scientific knowledge … regardless of location”).
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to, and use of scholarly knowledge across borders. 329
II.

III. THE “RIGHT TO RESEARCH” AND THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT
LAW

A. The Short or Medium Term: Copyright Law Reforms
The above analysis shows that there exists quite a solid basis for the “right
to research,” in both its domestic and extraterritorial dimension, under the
REBSPA (and associated rights). In the light of recognized access to
scientific knowledge needs, this must have implications for existing strict
copyright protection in the sphere of science. It is submitted that the way
forward for copyright and science is for the solutions of the first and second
models of reform of copyright, as outlined earlier, 330 to be made operational
in the short and medium term (the solutions of the first, the “milder”
subscription model, to the extent that, and for as long as, scholarly publishing
continues to follow the subscription model). These models do not question
the traditional role played by the commercial scholarly publishers. In the
longer term, as will be discussed under the next heading, the solutions of the
third model should, in principle, come to prevail. Clearly, these will take
longer to realize as they presuppose a wholesale reconceptualization of
institutionalized science. As it were, dissemination of, access to, and use of
scholarly publications should be as unencumbered by copyright as possible
until such time that science is genuinely open. Models 1 and 2 assume less
relevance, as model 3 becomes operational.
Mindful of the deficiencies of existing copyright law, also from a NorthSouth perspective, as reported on earlier, 331 an inventory of necessary
copyright reforms under models 1 and 2 could or should encompass the
following solutions:
Dissemination (the problem of limited authors’ rights under the
subscription model): Author-publisher standard contracts (or contract law as
such) should be redesigned to ensure that no assignment of copyright takes
place and that authors’ rights of reuse (republish, distribute, produce
derivatives, etc.) are preserved. 332
Access (the problem of high prices and perpetual control under the
subscription model): Price control will be necessary. A statutory body could
determine maximum charges. A copyright tribunal could find certain fees to
be “unreasonable.” Under competition law, subscription charges might be
329
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶ 21 (“international aspect,”
“establish and facilitate mechanisms for collaborative open science”); UNESCO
Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, ¶ 7, opening section (“access, re-use … regardless
of location”), ¶ 13(b) (“open science should … benefit humanity as a whole”), ¶ 22(b)
(“efforts towards universal access to the outputs of science”).
330

See supra Section I.B. (1., 2.).
See supra Section I.A. and the various sources cited there.
332
See Guibault, supra note 74, at 161–62 (referring to model clauses that may be used
in this regard).
331
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considered excessive. Compulsory licenses might be granted to compel
publishers to open content to other publishers. 333 Secrecy clauses in licensing
agreements must be forbidden to ensure transparency and prevent price
discrimination. It must be ensured that subscription agreements subtract
charges for “golden” open content in subscription journals. 334 Developed
states should require “their” publishers to apply differential pricing benefiting
libraries in developing states.
Use (the problem of use often being excluded, of insufficient scope, and
expensive): There is a need for a comprehensive research L&E, permitting
use and reuse of research materials for all scientific purposes (clearly
covering reproduction, format-shifting, storage, archiving, data extraction,
linking, quotation, translation and other forms of derivative use,
communication to the public, etc.), subject to a broad fairness test. This L&E
should expressly cover computational uses, including TDM. 335 This, in turn,
should cater for all relevant uses, such as reproduction, data extraction,
communication to the public (sharing a database with other scientists, also in
another country), adaptation (e.g., to make texts machine-readable), storage,
and so on, subject to the broad fairness test. 336 Moreover, libraries should
explicitly be allowed to take such measures as are necessary to preserve
works or replace them in certain instances. L&Es must permit digital lending
by libraries, remote access (even, as appropriate, from overseas) to library

333

See Reto M. Hilty, Renaissance der Zwangslizenzen im Urheberrecht? Gedanken
zu Ungereimtheiten auf der urheberrechtlichen Wertschöpfungskette, 111 GRUR 633, 641
et seq. (2009) (making this suggestion).
334
MORRISON, supra note 74, at 146.
335
See Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1439–41 (proposing such a broad
research exemption). UNESCO calls on member states to promote L&Es for research “that
allow distribution and re-use of a copyright work …, including partial or derivative use, on
the condition that the creator is appropriately credited, in accordance with international law.”
The express reference to derivative use is commendable, but there is no specific reference to
TDM: UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, ¶ 20(l).
336
See Flynn et al., supra note 48, at 393, 396–97 (“mechanisms” are needed “to
authorise TDM research,” including these uses). It may indeed be so that TDM, strictly
speaking, does not require specific exemption: see, e.g., Reto M. Hilty & Heiko Richter, Text
and Data Mining (Article 3 COM(2016) 593 final), in MODERNISATION OF THE EU
COPYRIGHT RULES: POSITION STATEMENT OF THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION 25, ¶¶ 6, 13–20 (Reto M. Hilty & Valentina Moscon eds., Max Planck
Inst. for Innov. & Competition, 2017) (arguing that TDM itself is a “normal use” for which
no consent is required; reproductions and extractions are implicitly authorized); Martin
Kretschmer & Thomas Margoni, Data Mining: Why the EU’s Proposed Copyright Measures
Get It Wrong, THE CONVERSATION (May 24, 2018), https://theconversation.com/datamining-why-the-eus-proposed-copyright-measures-get-it-wrong-96743 (“TDM refers to the
use of ideas, principles, facts and correlations”); Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant
Technology, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 1607 (2009) (arguing that TDM is a (permitted) “nonexpressive use”). Nevertheless, specific exemption would provide legal certainty and (must)
prevent the contractual exclusion of TDM. “Lawful access” requirements should be
interpreted leniently: Flynn et al., supra note 48, at 398. Against reasonable payment, TDM
should be possible with regard to whole datasets to which otherwise no lawful access exists:
Hilty & Richter, supra, ¶¶ 25–28.
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collections, and copies for larger groups and classes. Use should generally
encompass commercial uses since also these often are in the public
interest. 337 The above shows that L&Es should, where relevant, grant rights
extraterritorially. Finally, in developmental contexts, L&Es may legitimately
permit much wider research uses. In the global South, most copying should
be allowed without remuneration. Similarly, the reproduction or translation
of whole scholarly works may thus be acceptable, potentially subject to a
moderate remuneration obligation. 338 The “subscription” agreements should
cover not only access charges, but also fixed compensatory charges for “all
needed research uses,” under remunerated and beyond L&Es, and potentially
even APCs for researchers at the research institution concerned, all built into
the “subscription” price, to facilitate more transparent and affordable
deals. 339 The contractual restriction or exclusion of L&Es for research must
be forbidden. 340 Because TPMs easily obstruct legitimate use, they should,
as far as possible, be avoided as regards scientific literature. 341 Their
circumvention must be permissible where this is to secure user rights
otherwise available by law. 342 It has also been stated that circumvention
337

In this sense, see, e.g., Flynn et al., supra note 48, at 397 (explaining that also
commercial TDM often is in the public interest); Hilty & Richter, supra note 335, at ¶¶ 8,
10–12 (pointing out that it may be difficult to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial research and further underlining the high potential of commercial TDM for
innovation); Peukert & Sonnenberg, supra note 105, at 220 (referring to the comprehensive
access needs of businesses, concluding that L&Es for science should include commercial
research); Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1440–41 (arguing that a broad research
exemption should not distinguish between commercial and non-commercial research
because “basic scientific research results are … a public … good”).
338
See, e.g., (civil society) Treaty on Access to Knowledge, Art. 3-12(a)(iii), Draft,
2005,
May 10,
https://www.keionline.org/book/proposalfortreatyofaccesstoknowledgemay102005draft
(developing countries need “easier and less costly access to … science”) [hereinafter Access
to Knowledge Treaty].
339
See Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1467 (making this suggestion for “all
needed research uses”).
340
See Access to Knowledge Treaty, supra note 337, Art. 3(6)(a)(i) (“DRM/TPM
measures may undermine traditional limitations and exceptions”); COMM’N ON INTELL.
PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 59, at 109 (holding that such contract provisions should
be treated as void); Hilty, supra note 47, at 351–52 (arguing that Infosoc Directive, supra
note 35, Art. 6(4)(4), to the extent that it allows the restriction of L&Es for on-demand online
services, must be deleted); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright vs. Freedom of Scientific
Communication, 13 LEARNED PUBLISHING 77, 81 (2000) (“to preserve basic scientific
freedoms it is vital that copyright limitations protecting scientific uses be granted
‘imperative’ status”); Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1447 (emphasizing that L&Es
for research must be non-waivable). See generally Philippa Davies, Access v Contract:
Competing Freedoms in the Context of Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries,
35 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 402 (2013) (recommending recourse to mechanisms of contract
law, such as misuse of copyright, unfair contract terms, or abuse of rights, to protect freedoms
of access to and use of information in libraries).
341
See Hugenholtz, supra note 339, at 81 (through TPMs, “scientific freedoms are at
risk of being further compromised”).
342
Access to Knowledge Treaty, supra note 337, Art. 3-6(d). See also the interesting
suggestion for a “reverse notice and takedown” regime to protect legitimate research uses
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should generally be permissible in the case of “works of medical and
scientific literature.” 343 Circumvention may, most certainly, never be
criminalized.
Sui generis database protection: The focus here has not been on sui
generis database protection. Suffice it to state that the comprehensive
research L&E, including the L&E for computational uses detailed under
“use” above should apply to databases as well. No sui generis database
protection should be enacted in developing countries. 344
Bulk access: With the Berne Appendix being dysfunctional, in order to
satisfy, in developmental contexts, any need for bulk access to certain digital
(or print) scientific works that do not exist as translation in a country, or are
not available or only at an unreasonable charge, countries might adopt a
mechanism entitling the government or one or more research institutions to
apply for compulsory translation and/or reproduction licenses to a national
authority. The procedure should be as uncomplicated as possible. Modest
compensation would be payable. 345
Green and gold OA: In a world where the commercial scholarly
publishers (still) play a crucial role, options of green and (affordable) gold
OA must be guaranteed to authors. Legislation should grant authors an
inalienable right to self-archive and restrict embargo periods to a minimum.
In the case of gold OA, APCs should be borne by research institutions or
other funders. A global APC fund should be created for the benefit of
scientists working in countries of the global South. 346 Developed states
should require “their” publishers to offer waiver schemes for APCs benefiting
scientists in developing states. Gold OA cannot be mandated. Green OA
should be encouraged rather than mandated to protect scientific/academic
freedom.
Without examining this in detail, it is submitted that most, if not all, of
the above solutions could be realized under existing international IP law. IP
treaties, such as Berne, TRIPS, or the WCT – and thus also the three-step test
laid down in these instruments – must be interpreted “in the light of [their]

against TPMs: Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse
Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected
Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007).
343
Access to Knowledge Treaty, supra note 337, Art. 3-6(c)(ii).
344
COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 59, at 109. Generally
querying sui generis database protection, see Hugenholtz, supra note 339, at 77–78
(potentially in conflict with scientific freedom); Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1424
(“conflicts head on with customary scientific research practices”).
345
In a similar vein, see Access to Knowledge Treaty, supra note 337, Art. 3-12(a)(3)(5), (b)(1)-(6) (affirming that a new protocol for compulsory licenses is needed, covering
scientific works, also in electronic formats, entailing simpler procedures and faster decisionmaking).
346
See SCHEUFEN, supra note 92, at 155–56 (proposing a transnational funding
agency).
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object and purpose” 347 and further “any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties.” 348 The latter, as the
integration rule of international law, establishes the link between
international IP law and other fields of international law, including human
rights, and is directed at achieving an overall harmonized reading of
international law rules. 349
Regarding treaty “object and purpose,” one should certainly take note of
Article 7 (Objectives) and Article 8 (Principles) of TRIPS. The former refers
inter alia to the goal of IP rights “contribut[ing] … to the transfer and
dissemination of technology.” 350 Technology transfer must be read to include
transfer of scientific knowledge, seeing that technological advance flows
from such knowledge. In its 2002 Report, the U.K. Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights therefore articulates the need for technology
transfer agendas to include commitments of access to the benefits of publicly
funded research and open access to scientific databases. 351 The latter, in
Article 8(1), allows TRIPS countries to “adopt measures necessary … to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development” (provided these are “consistent
with” provisions of TRIPS). 352 Science undoubtedly is a sector of vital
importance to such development. 353 The WCT, in its preamble, specifically
emphasizes the larger public interest in research in the copyright context. 354
Regarding relevant international human rights law for purposes of
interpreting international IP treaties, this includes ICESCR provisions
protecting the REBSPA, the right to development, and the right to
international solidarity – and consequently also the “right to research” in its
domestic and extraterritorial dimensions, as deductively constructed in this
article. Limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights must comply with the
347

VCLT, supra note 181, Art. 31(1).
Id. Art. 31(3)(c).
349
On the integration rule in its application to international IP law, see HENNING
GROSSE RUSE‐KHAN, THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW Chs. 12–14 (2016).
350
TRIPS, supra note 10, Art. 7.
351
COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 59, at 26. One may well
argue that “technology” should, generally, be read widely as encompassing also scholarly or
cultural knowledge not related to “technological” advance in a strict sense. In this wide sense,
see WSIS, Declaration of Principles: Building the Inform. Soc’y: A Glob. Chall. in the New
Millennium, World Summ. on the Inform. Soc’y, Geneva 2003 – Tunis 2005, WSIS03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E, ¶ 24 (Dec. 12, 2003) (“Intellectual Property protection is important
to encourage innovation and creativity in the Information Society; similarly, the wide
dissemination, diffusion, and sharing of knowledge is important to encourage innovation and
creativity.”).
352
TRIPS, supra note 10, Art. 8(1).
353
See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 106 (2007) (stating that it is for the
particular member state to decide which sectors are implicated and whether they are of vital
importance).
354
WCT, supra note 42, Art. 10.
348
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three-step test of international copyright law. 355 The Max Planck Institute’s
Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in
Copyright Law of 2008 points out that, under the test, the legitimate interests
of third parties “deriving from human rights and fundamental freedoms” and
“the public interest in scientific progress” must be taken into account. 356 Its
more recently proposed International Instrument on Permitted Uses in
Copyright Law reiterates this and suggests that states should permit uses for
the purpose of research. 357 As it were, the three-step test “must perfectly
mirror the demands of human rights. Or, stated differently: the three-step test
must permit any such use as constitutes an entitlement under human
rights.” 358 Interestingly, TRIPS and the WCT contain various provisions
implying linkage with the right to development. The preamble of TRIPS
recognizes that national systems for the protection of IP rights may validly
be designed to pursue “developmental and technological objectives.” 359 It
also recognizes the needs of least-developed countries with respect to
“maximum flexibility” in the design of national IP systems. 360 Both TRIPS
and the WCT require implementation in accordance with a state’s “own legal
system and practice.” 361 The WIPO Development Agenda of 2007 affirms
the linkage. Expressly referring to Article 7 of TRIPS, it underlines that IP
rights should be implemented in the context of “especially developmentoriented concerns.” 362
B. The Long Term: Regulating, Reordering, or Removing Copyright
Claims in Constructing a “True” Scholarly Knowledge Commons?
In the light of the far-reaching needs for unimpeded dissemination of,
access to, and use of scientific knowledge – strongly backed by the “right to
research” – it is doubtful that the reforms of copyright outlined above will be
sufficient to meet the demands of science in the final analysis and comply
with the REBSPA (which, it should be remembered, is to be realized
progressively until an “ideal” state of realization has been reached). The
discussion has borne out the excesses of the scholarly publishing industry and
the role copyright plays in making these possible. The crucial question – as
pertinently posed by Reichman and Okediji – therefore is, “should scientific
publishers’ customary interests be preserved at the expense of scientists’ need
for wholesale access to, and reuse of, the exploding universe of published

355

Berne Convention, supra note 29, Art. 9(2); TRIPS, supra note 10, Art. 13; WCT,
supra note 42, Art. 10.
356
Geiger et al., Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test in
Copyright Law, supra note 32, at 712, ¶ 6.
357
Reto M. Hilty et al., International Instrument on Permitted Uses in Copyright Law, 52
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 62, 65 (A.II.2.(d)), 66 (B.II.2) (2021).
358
Beiter, supra note 316, at 54–55.
359
TRIPS, supra note 10, Preamble, Recital 5.
360
Id. Preamble, Recital 6.
361
Id. Art. 1(1). Similarly, see WCT, supra note 42, Art. 14 (1) (“in accordance with their
legal systems”).
362
WIPO Development Agenda Recommendations, supra note 314, Recomm. 45.
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scientific literature and data?” 363 Related to that, what role, if any, can
copyright continue to play in the sphere of science? In the light of the
parameters of “another science,” as based on the concept of “adequacy for
science,” it is submitted that the solutions of model 3 should ultimately be
implemented. These envisage nothing less than a full reconceptualization of
institutionalized science, science becoming genuinely open, and a “true”
scholarly knowledge commons (SKC) being created.
In “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Garrett Hardin had maintained that
the unavoidable fate of the traditional commons was their demise, as
everybody would just use, but not feel obliged to “look after” them, to ensure,
as we would say today, their sustainable use. This supports arguments in
favor of private property. A private owner would invest in the preservation
of the property because he could then draw a continuous rent from controlled
access to the property. 364 Assuming this reasoning to be correct (and it may
not be), it clearly cannot apply to knowledge. Knowledge is not depleted by
its consumption. On the contrary, it increases. 365 While the “first” enclosure
of physical property has largely been accomplished, James Boyle
recommends recourse to “the language of the commons” to offer limits to the
“second” enclosure, that of knowledge as an intangible creation of the
mind. 366
What then would be the demands for a “true” SKC? This should realize
both the right or freedom of scientists, but also others, “to do research” and
the right of citizens to enjoy “access to the benefits of research.” It should
operate globally. 367 It should maximize the benefits of OA. Some say these
include more citations. 368 They certainly include facilitating validation and
363
364

365

366

367

368

Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1413.
Thus the gist of the argument: Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (Dec. 13, 1968).
See, e.g., Rainer Kuhlen, Knowledge and Information: Private Property or Common
Good? A Global Perspective, in ETHICS AND LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
CURRENT PROBLEMS IN POLITICS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 213, 215 (Christian Lenk,
Nils Hoppe & Roberto Andorno eds., 2007) (digital intellectual works “are not consumed
in use, but rather gain value”); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS.
L. REV. 121, 156 (2010) (“Knowledge is a unique resource in that it actually increases …
as it is shared”).
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 62 (2003).
See Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1371 (“digital scientific research is
necessarily global in its sweep”); Salager-Meyer, supra note 117, at 185–86 (“enhances
the flow of knowledge between the global North and South and between South and
South”).
See Ball, supra note 74, at 183 (based on available research, concluding that “there is a
clear indication that there is some citation advantage in OA,” but that “it is not clear
whether OA is a factor of causation or a positive correlation”); Salager-Meyer, supra
note 117, at 185 (referring to various sources, concluding that OA “may increase …
citations”); Tennant, supra note 17, at 6, 8 (following an analysis of many sources,
concluding that “OA is broadly related to increased academic impact in terms of
citations”). It should be noted, however, that more citations do not necessarily equal a
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enhancing impact. 369 They encompass easy sharing of research data, reducing
duplicative research, and limiting blind alley research, 370 fast
communication, the ability to perform TDM and reuse material, and the
public’s insight into scientific outcomes, 371 “the progressive generation of
further research,” 372 promoting technological innovation and economic
growth, meeting the needs of a knowledge-based society, and advancing vital
interests of the Kulturstaat. 373
As to the essential OA parameters, according to the Declaration agreed
on by the Budapest Open Access Initiative in 2001, the adoption of which
must really be seen as the starting point of the OA debate in science, OA
means free digital availability on the internet and consumption and use by
any person for any purpose “without financial, legal, or technical barriers.” 374
The Declaration points out that free access does not mean “costless to
produce,” to then add that costs would be lower though and that “new cost
recovery models and financing mechanisms” would be required. 375 The only
requirement set by the Declaration is that authors’ moral rights must be
respected. 376 The Budapest Declaration forgot to mention that OA
availability needs to be immediate. This has been rectified in the Bethesda
Declaration of 2003. 377 Peter Suber defines OA similarly, making visible the
nuance, however, that OA means access “free of most copyright and licensing

369

370
371
372
373

374

375
376
377

higher impact of the actual knowledge concerned: Cope & Kalantzis, supra note 108, at
46. Furthermore, a study of ecology papers showed that only 76% of citations clearly
supported the claim which they were intended to reinforce: Peter A. Todd & Richard J.
Ladle, Hidden Dangers of a “Citation Culture,” 8 ETHICS SCI. & ENVTL. POL. 13, 14
(2008).
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1374 (“verification”); Schmidt-Aßmann, supra
note 259, at 117 (“validation”); Sitek & Bertelmann, supra note 303, at 151 (“faster …
discussion”); UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, Preamble, Recital 6
(“quality, reproducibility and impact”).
See Kimbrough & Gasaway, supra note 106, at 270 (mentioning these aspects).
See Sitek & Bertelmann, supra note 303, at 151 (mentioning these aspects).
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1374.
See Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 259, at 117 (“knowledge-based society,”
“Kulturstaat”); UNESCO Recommendation (2021), supra note 25, Preamble, Recital 17
(“economic benefits”).
Budapest Open Access Initiative, Budapest Declaration, Budapest, Hungary (Feb. 14,
2002), https://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/read, 3d section.
Id. 4th section
Id. 3d section.
The principles of the Budapest Declaration have been reiterated in subsequent civil
society statements. See, e.g., Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the
Sciences and Humanities, adopted by German research organizations and certain other
signatories,
Berlin,
Germany
(Oct. 22,
2003),
https://openaccess.mpg.de/67605/berlin_declaration_engl.pdf; Bethesda Statement on
Open Access Publishing, adopted by representatives of the wider biomedical research
community,
Bethesda,
MD,
U.S.
(June 20,
2003),
https://www.ouvrirlascience.fr/bethesda-statement-on-open-access-publishing; recently,
in 2019, São Paulo Statement on Open Access, supra note 307.
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restrictions.” 378 Also he points out that OA literature is “free of charge for
readers and users, but not for producers.” 379 If OA is to be considered a
human right, 380 then it should be underlined, as has been done in this article,
that a “true” SCK must include free publishing for researchers and overall a
reorientation toward affordable scholarly publishing to safeguard research
resources and protect funders and institutions. Otherwise, the SKC would
essentially be a libertarian project. Similarly, the fewer the restrictions, the
higher the compliance with the “right to research.” 381
Another crucial point to mention is that the SKC must exist in consonance
with criteria of “scientific adequacy,” as described in this article. Hence,
published research should be the result of slow science. Articles and books
may be subjected to post-publication and peer-to-peer review, but should not
undergo traditional peer review. The SKC should exist in an environment in
which science evaluation focuses on quality, but also plays a much reduced
role. The SKC itself should largely refrain from displaying article
metrics/altmetrics. Various human rights-related concerns need to be
attended to in establishing the SKC. Internet access must be established as a
universal right. 382 Information should not be censored or filtered. 383 Access
for the visually impaired must be ensured. 384 Language barriers must be
removed. Publication should be possible in various languages, automated
translation services be offered. 385 Tolerance of “accented” English should be
displayed. 386 There should be a move toward mega journals and huge subject
archives, facilitating overall “coherence” in science. 387 Platforms could use
378

379

380
381

382

383
384
385
386
387

Peter Suber, Creating an Intellectual Commons through Open Access, in
UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS 171, 171 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor
Ostrom eds., 2007).
Id. at 172. In principle, OA publishing is cheaper than subscription publishing as costs
for TPMs and subscription agreements and management fall away: id. at 182.
See Skre & Eide, supra note 63, at 430 (“Approaching Open Access as a Human Right”).
Open content licenses not permitting commercial use would not comply with the
commons ideology: Guibault, supra note 74, at 165; neither would those not permitting
the creation of derivate works.
See Łukasz Szoszkiewicz, Internet Access as a New Human Right? State of the Art on
the Threshold of 2020, 8 ADAM MICKIEWICZ U.L. REV. 49, 59 (2018) (“current
developments allow us to claim that we may be indeed witnessing a process of a new
human right being recognized, or rather forged”).
Suber, supra note 377, at 183.
Id.
Id.; Cope & Kalantzis, supra note 108, at 53.
Id.
See, e.g., Binfield, supra note 69, at 158 (stating that the typical features of a mega journal
include that articles are judged only on scientific soundness (not impact), the journals
have a very broad subject scope, they are “open access,” and have a large editorial board
of academic (not professional) editors); Margot Wehrmeijer, Exposing the Predators:
Methods to Stop Predatory Journals 71 (Master thesis, Leiden University, 2014),
https://studenttheses.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/28943 (explaining that, over time,
there should be one or a few platforms encompassing all fields, which include journal
articles, books, software, and datasets and are owned by one or more consortia of
universities and other research institutions).
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open source software providing a guided path to authors from submission to
publication. 388 Datasets should accompany books and articles. Journal quality
is overseen by editorial boards of established experts. 389 Lay summaries to
publications should be provided. 390 Scientists “need to diversify the way
[they] write,” addressing also lay audiences. 391 While the SKC would include
both articles and books as still recognizable genres, blogs, online discussions,
abstracts, articles in the lay press, or social media texts, could share ideas,
preliminary results, and negative results at earlier stages. 392 Finally, OA
publishing or archiving should not be “enforced” or “incentivized.” To
respect scientific/academic freedom, mere good argument (and the
availability of technical support) should encourage scientists to follow that
practice. 393
If the aim is to avert the looming neoliberally-induced “breakdown of
scientific thought,” 394 and to realize “another science” and create a “true”
SKC, what would be the implications for the role of the commercial (and
other) publishers and copyright? It is clear that the proprietization of science
has made the business model of the scholarly publishing industry possible in
the first place. This – built on the edifice of copyright monopoly – obstructs
the dissemination of, access to, and use of scientific literature. Especially
scientists and research institutions in the global South are detrimentally
affected. “Another science” would thus require some form of control of the
commercial scholarly publishers, limiting their market power and profit
margins. This could occur in three conceivable ways.
First, one could seek to mitigate (regulate) the copyright claims of
scholarly publishers. A statutorily regulated collective approach to
bargaining in relation to reimbursement accompanied by automatic open
content licenses benefiting users would be a possibility. Publishers, research
institutions, and funders would be mandatory members of a collecting
society, agreeing on what should be paid to publishers. Copyright here could
remain with authors. The collecting society would be responsible for
388
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See, e.g., James MacGregor, Kevin Stranack & John Willinsky, The Public Knowledge
Project: Open Source Tools for Open Access to Scholarly Communication, in OPENING
SCIENCE: THE EVOLVING GUIDE ON HOW THE INTERNET IS CHANGING RESEARCH,
COLLABORATION AND SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, supra note 40, at 165, 165 (“open source
software (free) publishing platforms as an alternative path”).
See, e.g., EGER & SCHEUFEN, supra note 80, at 110 (arguing that leading scholars in a
discipline should serve as members of the editorial board).
Day, supra note 63, at 6.
Andrew Walker, Shift Away from “Publish or Perish” Puts the Public Back into
Publication, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 4, 2015), https://theconversation.com/shiftaway-from-publish-or-perish-puts-the-public-back-into-publication-51580.
Broadly in this sense, see Bartling & Friesike, supra note 40, 8–9.
Cf. Suber, supra note 377, at 192 (universities should “requir[e] OA to all the research
articles that faculty would like the P&T committee to consider”).
Thus broadly the message of the edited volume: TRANSFORMATIONS IN RESEARCH,
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE ACADEMIC MARKET: THE BREAKDOWN OF SCIENTIFIC
THOUGHT, supra note 200.
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“scientific works.” A mechanism would have to be identified for categorizing
works as “scientific.” The collecting society would collect payments and
reimburse publishers. Such an interesting model has been proposed by John
Willinksy (I termed this model “3 minus” earlier), who argues that it
complies with the three-step test. 395 This first approach seeks to keep the
monetary claims of publishers within bounds, simultaneously securing
automatic OA to scientific works. Yet, it largely accepts the traditional role
of the commercial scholarly publishers, who would, de facto, retain their
monopoly claims grounded in copyright, based inter alia on the assertion that
quality control (peer review) continues to be carried out under their auspices.
A substantial financial burden would still rest on institutions and funders. The
reimbursements claimed by a publisher would notably depend on the quantity
it publishes. Commercial considerations will thus continue to play an
important role in decisions whether and how to publish. Moreover, would this
model as installed at the national level benefit users globally or would that
only follow if the collecting society operates at the international level for
various or all countries? Or would the benefits of national schemes accrue to
users as between states on a reciprocity basis? It may be noted in this regard
that the feasibility of the collecting society model has generally be questioned
for developing countries, as the societies concerned collect mainly for foreign
right-holders and because of the costs entailed. 396
Second, one could seek to reorder the copyright claims of the various
stakeholders in the science sector. Authors, research institutions, and
scientific communities regain “ownership” (managerial, editorial, quality
control, production, circulation, etc.) over their articles, journals, books, and
book series. Copyright is not assigned to publishers. This remains with
authors. Authors would be enabled, and agree, to publish open access, to
make their research freely available online for everyone globally without
undue restrictions. 397 Publication could occur with or without the support of
commercial or other publishers. As these would “merely” be rendering
contracted services, they could not require reimbursement based on copyright
or a de facto copyright monopoly. Reliance on open source software, inhouse capacities of research institutions, and the services of not-for-profit
university publishers may perform many of the services traditionally
performed by commercial publishers. This approach envisages a new,
reduced role for the scholarly publishers. Commercial publishing, in its
current form, would lose much its attractiveness. 398 As there exists no
395
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Willinsky, supra note 93, esp. Ch. 6. Another way to mitigate copyright claims of
scholarly publishers would be to introduce the doctrine of “first sale” for digital
(scholarly) works to eliminate the problem of perpetual control and charges: Suber, supra
note 377, at 178. This would require the amendment of international copyright law.
COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 59, at 98–99.
On open content licensing options, see supra note 75 & note 380.
See, e.g., Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1472 (“absorbing the publishing
function, when feasible, into integrated, open-knowledge environments”); Wehrmeijer,
supra note 386, at 71 (“disseminating research completely independent of publishers
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institutional guarantee of the commercial publishing industry, its
disappearance would not be “unconstitutional.” 399
The approach, as outlined, cannot really be imposed by way of state
legislation. It largely depends on the self-organizing capacities of
institutionalized science. The approach can, however, only be realized if
science is adequately funded by the state. Research institutions and scientific
communities would clearly need additional infrastructural, human, and
technical resources. In this sense, this approach does require a new legislative
framework, namely one that renounces the neoliberal approach to science
based on the state’s underfunding and the commercialization of science. A
new science environment, in turn, would free required time resources lost in
the current system.
The second approach is still founded on the category of copyright. It
operates on the premise that copyright’s default positions will be
contractually modified to achieve the desired ends (allowing free use to all
and generally waiving economic copyright). From a doctrinal point of view,
this is rather awkward. Furthermore, while authors have traditionally not
claimed payment for articles from publishers, they do so – and may be
adamant to be allowed to continue doing so – for monographs. However,
there is no problem of underproduction for monographs either. On the
contrary, the economic incentive leads to an overproduction of truth
detrimental to science also in this respect. Copyright, even if now with the
author, thus remains a problem.
Third, one could remove the copyright claims of the various stakeholders
in the science sector. This third approach replicates the previous, just without
the availability of copyright protection for scientific works. There are a
number of good reasons why dispensing with copyright protection in the
sphere of science makes sense. Article 9(2) of TRIPS and Article 2 of the
WCT restate the accepted maxim that copyright protection extends “to
expressions and not to ideas.” 400 It should be appreciated that scientific
works, more often than not, capture mere ideas. Where writing must narrowly
focus on raw data, reflect a certain scientific methodology, use as lucid a
language as possible, and comply with technical conventions, the scope for
original expression is limited. 401 It is probably correct to say that creativity in
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might become possible”).
Peukert & Sonnenberg, supra note 105, at 226.
TRIPS, supra note 10, Art. 9(2); WCT, supra note 42, Art. 2.
In this sense, see Krzysztof Gienas, Scientific Works: Another Dimension of Copyright
Protection, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 801, 801 (2008). See also Christophe Geiger,
Copyright as an Access Right: Securing Cultural Participation through the Protection of
Creators’ Interests, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 73, 101 (Rebecca
Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017) (arguing that, ideally, “[o]nly expressions
that are the result of a creational process in which the freedom of the creator has been
superior to imposed necessities … may enjoy copyright protection”).
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science exists at a different, the pre-fixation level. 402 At any rate, however,
awarding blanket protection to scientific works is not even in accordance with
current copyright law.
More generally, there is no problem of underproduction of articles and
books in science. Scientists do research by reason of their curiosity (intrinsic
motivation) and their incentive to publish is primarily in order to gain a
reputation (extrinsic motivation), as the impact of their work depends on their
standing in the scientific community. 403 Copyright as an economic incentive
is not needed in this regard. Naturally, scientists do depend on financial,
employment, and science-adequate work environment security. However,
this assumes the form of adequate salaries, permanent contracts or tenure, and
wide scientific/academic freedom, guaranteeing more security than a
copyright approach, and, for that reason, better suited to serve the best interest
of science. One might, of course, argue that the economic incentive of
copyright is needed for the scholarly publishing industry to flourish.
However, the argument in this article has been that commercial scholarly
publishers add little value to the research process. While economic copyright
can therefore be dispensed with, it needs to be acknowledged that rights
currently protected as moral rights (rights of attribution, integrity, and so on)
remain important. Also some of the economic rights, “stripped of” their
remunerative element, are important. Hence, the right to publish is a crucial
right of scientists. However, in constructing the “right to research” above, it
has been shown that what are now moral rights and rights such as the (noneconomic) right to publish are part of the “right to research” in any event. It
may be necessary to strengthen some of these. While in a world without
scientific copyright the “owner” could not, for instance, prevent a user from
adapting (e.g., translating) their work, a robust right of integrity could offer
protection against any adaption clearly lacking in quality. Scientists could
also always make a public declaration to the effect that they disapprove of
the way in which a certain work of theirs has been used.
The third approach is not tantamount to saying that authors’ rights, as
human rights, insofar as scientific works are concerned, should not be
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See Gienas, supra note 400, at 801 (“one may express some doubt as to whether scientific
activity is really also creative activity in the copyright sense”). Cf. Peukert & Sonnenberg,
supra note 105, at 201 (arguing that, in the sphere of science, the transition between form
and content “is, in certain cases, fluid”).
See Budapest Declaration, supra note 373, 1st section (“scholars … publish … without
payment, for the sake of inquiry and knowledge”); Bellia & Moscon, supra note 57, at 4
(“scholarly literature is in no way affected by underproduction problems”); EGER &
SCHEUFEN, supra note 80, at 10–11 (explaining the reward structure in science along
similar lines); Moscon, supra note 16, at 101 (“The incentive … is mostly reputational”);
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1427–28 (authors’ “primary interests in
publication are the rewards of attribution and integrity”); Shavell supra note 94, at 305
(“academics are motivated to write to gain scholarly respect”); Skre & Eide, supra
note 63, at 439 (“The incentives … would seem to be to achieve impact of the research
results, in the form of attention, influence and citations”).
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protected. Consequently, it does not conflict with Article 15(1)(c) of the
ICESCR, obliging states parties to protect the right of authors “[t]o benefit
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which [they are] the author.” 404
Scientific productions, as the CESCR points out, include “scientific
publications.” 405 Yet, protecting these moral and material interests need not
occur in the form of awarding copyright. Effective protection against
plagiarism and misrepresentation, adequate salaries, and so on, may achieve
the same goal. 406 However, the approach, it needs to be conceded, would
require an amendment of the Berne Convention. This requires copyright
protection to be available for “literary and artistic works,” these including
“every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain.” 407
One must agree with Morrison when she states that “[t]he pursuit of
scholarship is inherently incompatible with the goal of profit.” 408 The
practices of the commercial scholarly publishers conflict with slow and
quality science, editorial independence, and the unimpeded dissemination of,
access to, and use of scholarly publications. Copyright’s main function in
science at the moment is to make these corrupting practices possible, purely
in the interest of profit. All this contradicts the concept of “adequacy for
science,” which has been central to the discussion in this article. It is
submitted that the third approach – that of dispensing with copyright in the
sphere of science – complies with the normative demands of the “right to
research” under the REBSPA best. It guarantees most facilely and effectively
that scientific knowledge can be disseminated, accessed, and used without
obstruction, domestically and internationally. It ensures most securely that
the commercial scholarly publishers cannot exploit copyright to cause harm
to the fabric of science. It eliminates unnecessary transaction costs.
Conceptually speaking, it is the soundest. It best facilitates the creation of a
“true” scholarly knowledge commons. All the rules of copyright that would
retain their relevance in a future world of science form part of the unwritten
laws of science and are effectively protected by the “right to science” under
the REBSPA.
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ICESCR, supra note 15, Art. 15(1)(c).
General Comment No. 17, supra note 161, ¶ 9.
Thus the overall tone of the CESCR’s General Comment No. 17.
Berne Convention, supra note 29, Art. 2(1). For an account of the difficult history of
scientific works under Berne, see SARA BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 34-46 (2016). It is problematic in this context that the wording
of UNESCO’s relevant Recommendations is couched in strict IP terms: UNESCO
Recommendation (1997), supra note 155, ¶ 12 (“The intellectual property of highereducation teaching personnel should benefit from appropriate legal protection.”);
UNESCO Recommendation (2017), supra note 20, ¶¶ 16(b)(iii), 37 (“fully respect the
intellectual property rights of individual researchers”; ensure that the scientific results of
researchers enjoy “the protection afforded by patent and copyright law”).
MORRISON, supra note 74, at 51.
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CONCLUSION
A global scholarly knowledge commons of sorts does exist: Sci-Hub.409
It is, however, illegal. It was developed in 2011 by Aleksandra Elbakyan, a
Kazakhstan national, who, as a student, due to paywalls, did not have access
to research papers needed for her research project. She therefore started
pirating them. She created the website to help others in the same situation.410
According to Sci-Hub, there are now almost 88.000.000 million “papers” on
the platform. 411 Sci-Hub is widely used by scientists around the world. 412 In
the same way that the poor, who have been left destitute by unbridled
capitalism, exploitative communism, or inhuman colonialism, may steal food
to satisfy their hunger, scientists and citizens, exposed to an enforced famine
of scholarly knowledge, may seek to regain control of that knowledge, which
has been created by publicly funded researchers pursuing scientific truth for
the benefit of humanity as a whole.
This article has sought to construct a (derivative) “right to research” under
the REBSPA in Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR (and associated rights) that
comprises both a domestic and an extraterritorial dimension. It has sought to
interpret Article 15(1)(b) purposively, thus following a more human rightsoriented approach, which places the emphasis on the concept of “adequacy
for science.” In this way, it was sought to ensure that the “right to research”
would be consonant with quality science, autonomy for scientists, a positive
organizational culture, low hierarchies, reduced emphasis on evaluation, and
trust. Accordingly, much more emphasis has been placed on the
scientific/academic freedom of researchers than is customarily the case in
existing official interpretations of the REBSPA. The article finds that, indeed,
a strong case can be made for such a “right to research.” The implications
thereof for copyright and digital science are twofold: remaining within a
traditional copyright paradigm, various reforms of copyright law are
necessary in the interim to facilitate scientists’ right “to do research” and that
of citizens to enjoy “access to the benefits of research.” In the long run,
however, it will be necessary to move toward “another science,” a genuinely
open science, entailing notably the creation of a “true” scholarly knowledge
commons. To a greater or lesser extent, such a science will have to move
beyond the (traditional) “copyright” paradigm to adequately realize
unimpeded dissemination of, access to, and use of scholarly publications.
This transition is needed because, in the digital era, copyright has mainly
come to have the effect of siphoning off public resources for research to a
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See Daniel S. Himmelstein et al., Sci-Hub Provides Access to Nearly All Scholarly
Literature, ELIFE 7:e32822, DOI: 10.7554/eLife.32822 1, 1 (2018) (“For the first time,
nearly all scholarly literature is available gratis to anyone with an Internet connection”).
Elsevier Inc. et al. v. Sci-Hub et al., 15 Civ. 4282(RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2015), Letter
addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Alexandra Elbakyan re: Clarification of
details,
entered
Sept. 15,
2015,
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.442951.50.0.pdf.
See “About Sci-Hub,” https://sci.hubg.org.
Reporting on Sci-Hub, see Bohannon, supra note 7; Karaganis, supra note 62, at 1–3.
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scholarly publishing industry that adds little value to the research process.
“Less innovation, not more, is the predictable result over time.” 413 But not
only that, the (copyright-based) practices of the commercial scholarly
publishers corrupt science also in a more general sense. It was explained that
academic science increasingly assumes the nature of industrial science,
contrary to the normative demands of the REBSPA and the “right to
research.” The immense economic power of the scholarly publishing industry
and its effective control over institutionalized science must be held to be
founded on proprietary claims which have their basis in the monopoly
conferred by copyright. This design of that industry is directly linked to the
shift toward industrial science.
At the outset, this writer had reported that he had been unable to digitally
retrieve Reto Hilty’s article on “Copyright Law and the Scientist” in doing
the research for this article. This begs the question, is the privatization of
scholarly knowledge the right answer to preserving, and facilitating the
generation of further, scholarly knowledge? Does it work better than the
commons idea? Another article I have not been able to find through
affordable available channels despite a major search effort was Garrett
Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons.” The irony of this, I believe,
answers the question.
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Reichman & Okediji, supra note 28, at 1426.
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